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**MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**No. 1657**



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# USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### LOCAL WARS EXAMINED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 44-46

[Article by Maj Gen V. Matsulenko, D. Sc. (History), Professor: "Lessons of Imperialist Local Wars"]

[Text]

Local wars waged by the USA and other capitalist states have been and are aimed at crushing national-liberation movements and keeping the developing countries within the pale of imperialist political and economic dependence. They are also directed at preserving the political, economic and military positions of imperialism in different areas of the globe and weakening the world socialist system.

By its aggressive wars in Korea (1950-53), Cuba (1961) and Vietnam (1964-75) American imperialism strove to restore the capitalist order in these countries and thus to deal a sensitive blow at the world socialist system. After the Second World War imperialists resorted dozens of times to armed force in African, Asian and Latin American countries with a view to preserve their domination there and have the possibility to further plunder their peoples.

The leading role in unleashing local wars belongs to the United States of America which is responsible for the majority of local wars and armed provocations initiated by the imperialists. In their drive for world domination the ruling circles of that country more than once brought the world to the brink of a global thermonuclear holocaust. The USA encourages in every way the aggressive actions of other capitalist states against progressive countries. For example, the USA directly participates in and inspires Israel's aggressive strivings and actions.

The Reagan Administration openly declared its intention to use military force for suppressing the national-liberation movement and ensuring the "vital interests" of the country (i. e. of the

American monopolies) in different areas of the globe. Last year the world witnessed a whole series of aggressive actions by the USA and its henchmen in Lebanon, Angola, El Salvador, Iraq, Iran and other countries.

The policy of the Peking leaders has recently been more and more aggressive. Jointly with the imperialists, and those of the USA in the first place, they are waging a fierce struggle against the national-liberation forces in various countries. China is taking part in the undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, continuously organising armed provocations against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, maintaining tension on its borders with neighbouring countries and openly laying claims to their territories.

In these circumstances, it is most important to take into account the lessons of imperialist local wars. Experience shows that the imperialists and their henchmen work out detailed plans of aggression, deliberately and secretly prepare forces for a surprise blow in order to seize the initiative and achieve decisive results in a short time.

By what methods, for instance, did Israel manage to attain surprise in the war against the Arab countries in 1967? The Western press notes that first of all this was achieved due to the deception of Egypt in which the United States of America played not the last role. For example, on the eve of the Israeli aggression the US President Johnson invited a top-level Egyptian delegation to visit the USA to discuss the Egyptian-Israeli crisis. The delegation was scheduled to leave in the morning of June 5, i. e. on the day of the ag-

gression. Besides, Charles Yost, the envoy of the American President in Cairo, assured the Egyptian government that Israel would not begin intervention.

The Israeli Command also took a number of steps to misinform Egypt both politically and militarily. Thus, the Israeli government declared that they did not want to begin war and desired to solve peacefully the sharpening contradictions with the Arab countries.

But the fact is that the plan of aggression codenamed "Pigeon" had been developed long before the aggressive actions started. The American press noted at the time that the Israeli Army had been planning for a long time to strike a surprise blow to take advantage of the mobility of their troops and "was long to realise this advantage." The then Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army Rabin stated: "Everything has been envisaged for a war which will last from 72 to a maximum of 96 hours." Troop concentration areas were carefully camouflaged. The units advanced to the border by night strictly observing blackout rules. Both on the airfields and in the air the usual combat activity was maintained. Radio silence was imposed and only fictitious messages were allowed to be transmitted to mislead the Arabs. To deceive the Arab countries' intelligence the personnel of a number of second echelon units were granted short leave.

Intelligence, including that of the USA (CIA and cosmic), FRG and NATO operational reconnaissance, contributed vastly to the surprise of the Israeli forces' actions and the effectiveness of air attacks by providing the Israeli Command with detailed information on the grouping of forces and the location of airfields and AA weapons of the Arab countries.

Several months before the beginning of military operations in June 1967, the former charge d'affaires of the USA in Cairo G. Ness recalls, the military intelligence data required by Washington from the American embassies, the CIA and military intelligence officials in the Near East were mainly prepared with an eye to Israeli's needs... The effectiveness of the air raids carried out by Israel on June 5, 1967 was ensured, at least partially, due to information about the location of Egyptian airfields and planes received from American sources. Hence an important lesson is to be drawn about the necessity to keep the armed forces in constant combat readiness for repelling aggression.

Experience of local wars proved the importance of timely preparation, rapid mobilisation and deployment of the reserves of the country

that has become an object of aggression. Lack of the required reserves in the Korean People's Army at the initial stage of the war allowed the American Command to land seaborne forces at Inchon and exploit the success north of the 38th parallel. Lack of the necessary reserves in the Egyptian Army at the beginning of the war of 1967 also made it possible for the invaders to carry out large-scale offensive operations.

The beginning and the course of local wars have proved that reconnaissance of all kinds plays an especially important role. The success of the Israeli aggression in 1967 was, for example, predetermined to a great extent by the weak intelligence of the Egyptian Army and the armies of the other Arab countries, which failed to detect in time the preparations being made by the Israeli armed forces for the attack.

Thus, well-organised intelligence is a most important condition for success in rebuffing aggression.

Experience tells us that in local wars the imperialists test new types of weapons. The territories of the countries attacked serve for them as a proving ground where they test the capabilities and effectiveness of new types of equipment and weapons and the troops' field training standard. In Korea the Americans for the first time used on a wide scale jet fighters, ship-to-surface guided missiles, helicopters for tactical landings, new types of tanks, small arms and parachutes. In Vietnam they employed strategic jet bombers and the latest supersonic fighters, self-propelled artillery and amphibious tanks, new types of helicopters, guns and grenade launchers. In the wars against the peoples of Korea, Algeria and Vietnam the imperialists used chemical weapons and napalm, and not only on the battlefield but also against the civil population.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 showed the great role of antitank defence based on ATGMs and conventional artillery. The defence of the Egyptians was especially strong in respect of antitank defence as it widely used ATGMs, which proved to be highly effective, and hand-operated antitank grenade launchers. The Newsweek magazine wrote at the time that Russian ATGMs provided an infantryman with something that he had not had before: a high probability of destroying tank with the first shot and before it could use its own weapons.

Combat operations demonstrated graphically the necessity for increasing the efficiency of antitank defence and reinforcing it with engineer works. The step forward made by defence is explained first of all by the use of rocket weapons.

And it is not fortuitous that the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 is called abroad "the war of tactical guided missiles." The Western press underlines that it was a war of aircraft against anti-aircraft weapons, a war of tanks against anti-tank defences.

The air forces also demonstrated great possibilities in that war. But the experience of combat employment of air forces convincingly proved that air supremacy could be gained only on condition that the enemy air defence system, especially surface-to-air missiles (SAM) were neutralised or destroyed. That is why the first strikes were directed against the SAM systems and the aircraft flew at low altitudes which prevented their destruction by anti-aircraft weapons. If in 1956 and 1967 the Israeli air force could quickly gain air supremacy and deal heavy blows at the Egyptian airfields, in the war of 1973 it failed to do so due to the Egyptians' well-organised anti-aircraft system. The Israeli Command underestimated the effectiveness of the Soviet-made Egyptian missiles.

The war vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of the air defence system, especially that of the Egyptians. Two favourable factors contributed to this: the small width of the combat zone (140 km on the Egyptian front and even less on the Syrian front) which made it possible to achieve a high density of fire of short-range anti-aircraft systems, and the use of new types of weapons by the Arab anti-aircraft forces, which proved a surprise for the enemy air force. The Egyptian air defence system armed with stationary and mobile surface-to-air systems, quadruple and twin self-propelled AA guns provided with radar broke up the Israeli air attacks and inflicted heavy losses on its aviation. 80 per cent of the Israeli planes were shot down by surface-to-air missiles.

Combat experience demonstrated also the increased effectiveness and importance of electronic countermeasures aimed first of all at revealing enemy electronic detection and weapon control

systems and their subsequent destruction by fire or neutralisation by jamming. Both sides made wide use of jamming to neutralise the radio and radar equipment of the AA system and the troop control system. Extensive employment by the Israelis of Shrike anti-radar projectiles necessitated the development of new effective methods for combating them.

The outcome of local wars graphically proves that in a majority of cases the imperialists failed to attain their predatory aims. That was the case, for example, in the wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Near East and Cuba. Even representatives of American ruling circles were compelled to acknowledge this. H. Kissinger, then US Secretary of State, said in 1975 that after the bitter experience in Vietnam America had realised that it did not possess enough power to solve any problem, and that its influence was limited.

The lessons of local wars also tell us that peoples emerged victorious from an unequal struggle if they firmly relied on the aid and support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Their international solidarity has repeatedly proved a decisive force in frustrating the aggressive plans of the imperialists. The USSR and other socialist countries gave, for example, immense political, economic and military aid to the Korean People's Democratic Republic and to the Vietnamese people to repulse the aggression of the USA and its allies. The Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries constantly supported and support now the just cause of the Arab peoples struggling for their independence against Israeli aggression and the aggression of the Western powers. The Soviet Union rendered invaluable aid to the Cuban people in its struggle for independence and also to many African and Asian countries.

The lessons of local wars warn peoples and governments to be constantly vigilant and resolutely unmask the aggressive plans of imperialism.

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### BALANCE OF POWER ISSUES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 49-51

[Article by G. Viktorov: "Striving to Attain the Unattainable"]

[Text]

**H**ATRED of socialism has taken possession of the minds of the present US leaders to such an extent that they again return to the cold war policy and Dulles' notorious brinkmanship diplomacy, discarding treaties and agreements to curb the arms race and establish normal relations with the socialist countries signed by their predecessors and based on the principles of equality and equal security. In response to the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union aimed at continuing détente, the USA and its allies have adopted a number of measures that seriously aggravate the international situation. Washington's striving to upset the existing balance of forces and secure for itself and its NATO allies military superiority over the USSR and the other socialist countries is particularly dangerous for the cause of peace. The extensive programme declared by R. Reagan in late 1981 of deploying new nuclear-missile weapons embracing all types of strategic forces, which has aroused the indignation of the American and world public, is a striking example of this. Under the false and hackneyed pretext of a "Soviet military threat" the Reagan Administration has embarked on the road of an unprecedented arms race and militarisation of the life of the whole country. Irresponsible statements and speeches of the representatives of the American ruling circles distorting the Soviet peace policy follow one another. US Secretary of Defence C. Weinberger said, for example, that the USA will spend as much as it needs to boost America's military strength and gain an advantage over the Soviet Union and that it will not stop at using armed force, including nuclear weapons. Or take the reckless assertions of A. Haig, US State Secre-

tary, that there are things more important than peace.

US foreign policy is based on anti-Sovietism, suppression of national-liberation movements, destabilisation of the situation in the socialist countries and undermining socialism as a system. The American Administration stakes on restoring its strategic superiority in an endeavour to impose its own "code of conduct" on the world's peoples. Under the pretext of defending its "vital interests" Washington tries to legalise its "global policy" and its "right" to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, above all of the socialist countries. Being accustomed to thinking in the categories of force and diktat "the USA," said L. I. Brezhnev, "actually regards the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union as its main political credo. The solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of priorities, if they give serious thought to it at all."

Washington is drawing its Atlantic partners and Japan deeper and deeper into the reckless policy of the arms race, promoting the build-up of the military potential of China, attempting to knock together an anti-Soviet military alliance in the Far East.

Never since the time of the cold war has the line of using force been so manifest in the US policy. C. Weinberger states that the USA must strengthen its positions in the world by means of weapons. This statement cannot be regarded as anything but war propaganda.

By 1986 the military expenditure of the USA will reach 367.5 thousand million dollars, an un-



precedented figure in the country's history. During the current five years (till 1986) the USA plans to spend on the armed forces the astronomic sum of 1.5 trillion dollars, that is almost as much as has been spent for military purposes during the past 12 years. To upset the approximate balance in the field of strategic arms the American ruling circles, contrary to their previous statements and conclusions, use the red herring of the USA's alleged lagging behind the USSR in this field. The same lie is repeated in another propaganda concoction which originated in the Pentagon and the CIA — the booklet "Soviet Military Power." This fraud has been issued to intimidate the Americans and the population of other NATO countries and, having achieved this goal, to make them obediently carry the increasing burden of military expenditures. It is not the USA's imaginary lag but the military strategic equilibrium that is not to the liking of the belligerent circles of the present American Administration. It hampers the implementation of US aggressive world plans, and blocks the road to implementing the idea of "global superiority."

Having deleted from their vocabulary the principles of equality and equal security, the American ruling circles try in the first place to ensure themselves an advantage in the field of nuclear armaments in order to create for the USA a position of superior strength at future talks with the USSR. They have practically blocked the SALT-2 Treaty, which seals the equality of strategic armament, limits the number of nuclear weapon carriers to the level of 2,250 and prevents their further increase.

The USA is building at an accelerated rate nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines of the Ohio type, MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, new B-1 strategic bombers, air-, sea- and land-based strategic cruise missiles and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles are being produced. The United States is adapting for military purposes the Shuttle space system which is to be the first step in a programme providing for the creation of strategic nuclear systems in space, though this is radically contrary to the 1967 treaty, signed also by the USA, banning the use of space for military purposes.

By the end of the eighties Shuttle will perform over 100 flights, and the total weight of cargoes delivered into space will amount to almost 3 thousand tons. In Washington they make no secret of the fact that the bulk of these cargoes will be for military purposes.

The Reagan Administration has declared its decision to start production of neutron weapons,

the most inhuman type of mass destruction weapon. This is one more striking example of and the new link in escalating the arms race and speeding up war preparations.

Vast amounts of new types of conventional weapons are flowing into the US forces. By 1986 it is planned to increase the strength of the US armed forces by almost 250,000 men. Interventionist "rapid deployment force" is being hastily formed. The number of American military bases and other military establishments in different parts of the world is increasing; their number now exceeds 2,500.

An especially dangerous situation is created by the belligerent circles of the USA and its allies in Western Europe. In its endeavour to attain strategic superiority, Washington attaches special importance to a "eurostrategic potential." Though for a number of years there has been parity in nuclear medium-range weapons between NATO and the USSR, about 1,000 carriers on each side, the USA is imposing on NATO, with the help of the FRG, a further strategic force of 572 medium-range missiles which would give NATO a 1.5 times superiority. By all appearances, the American neutron bomb will soon begin to force its way into Europe.

The Soviet proposal to place a moratorium on the deployment in Europe of medium-range nuclear-missile weapons by the NATO countries and the Soviet Union is being made dependent by the American Administration on a series of unacceptable unilateral conditions advantageous only for the West, and by efforts to "link" vital problems concerning the destiny of humanity with secondary ones. In the hands of Washington this method of "linking" is but a means for gaining superiority in the first place in the military sphere. And this in spite of the fact that any aggravation of the situation in Europe is especially dangerous because Europe is precisely the part of the world where the biggest military groupings — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty — confront each other, where tremendous arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons are accumulated.

In line with the ambitious plans of "military superiority," the USA is developing a new military strategy incorporating the ideas of Carter's notorious Directive No. 59, which stakes on a "limited nuclear war." This strategy is often called a "new global strategic conception." According to it the American Armed Forces and economy must be ready to wage simultaneously two big "non-nuclear wars," one in Europe and one in the Near East, and to "secure" settlement of disputable questions by using the might of the US Armed Forces.

So the US Administration has embarked on the road which leads not to détente and talks but to confrontation, not to parity and equality of forces but to military superiority over the USSR. The absurdity of these calculations is evident: the Soviet Union will never allow any military superiority over itself. These claims are illusory, absurd and impracticable. It would have been at least strange if in the face of aggressive preparations of the USA and its NATO allies the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries had not taken necessary steps to improve and maintain on the required level their defence, had not raised a dependable barrier in the way of the aggressor. "We have possibility to prevent the gaining of military superiority by the United States," said D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR. "As a result, the equilibrium will be preserved, but on a higher level. At the same time, Western Europe's security will not increase but diminish, while the West European countries themselves will become even more dependent on the Pentagon nuclear strategy."

The belligerent imperialist circles of the USA, possessed by a new fit of hegemonism and a striving for military superiority, are pursuing an unattainable but very dangerous aim.

In our times security may be real and stable only on condition that it is built on the basis of the existing approximate parity between the opposing armed forces and of subsequent curtailment of their levels. That is why the central direction in the Soviet military policy, as the 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed, has always been and remains the struggle for peace, for curbing the arms race. This is the purpose of all the Soviet peace initiatives. The Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World adopted in Moscow in June 1981 also calls for peace and détente.

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IMPORTANCE OF THE TIME FACTOR IN MODERN BATTLE DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 11-13

[Article by Maj Gen I. Vorobyov; under the rubric "Combat Training": "The Time Factor"]

[Text]

One of the laws in the development of tactics and operational art is that the improvement of technical weapons of war is bound to enhance the role of the time factor, which, accordingly, makes higher demands on commanders' and staff officers' proficiency. It should be emphasised that even the slightest delay in taking appropriate measures at any level of control may cause unjustified losses and failure to fulfil the assigned combat mission.

**T**HE TIME factor is a major component of success in battle. The ability to perform combat missions quickly, efficiently, in an organised manner, and within the specified time limits has always been an indicator of high combat skill. Gaining time is ultimately a most important condition for ensuring the troops' combat activity, seizing and holding the initiative, forestalling the enemy, frustrating his planned actions, imposing one's will on him and achieving surprise in dealing him a blow.

The decisive role of the time factor in battle was clearly manifest during the Great Patriotic War when, as compared with the previous wars, the fluidity and dynamics of battle and the rate and depth of forces' advance increased, and operational and tactical lulls between battles and, consequently, the time at the disposal of command-

ers and staffs for organising combat operations decreased.

In fighting the nazi invaders Soviet commanders demonstrated the ability to use the time factor correctly and effectively, to ensure uninterrupted massed fire on the enemy from the beginning to the end of the battle and to exploit success in good time, giving the enemy no respite by day or by night.

The swift actions of the 140th Infantry Regiment under Colonel S. Alexandrov in one of the battles of the last war may well serve as an illustration. Having broken through the enemy defences at Naval in July 1944, the regiment continued to advance into the depth. It had been assigned the mission to capture the railway station on the move. Reconnaissance revealed that the hitlerites had begun to bring up reserves in haste to that inhabited locality. The information was soon confirmed. When approaching a stream flowing 10 km from the railway the regiment's advanced subunits met with stubborn resistance from the nazi forces. According to the commander's assessment, committal of the regiment's main forces to action to deal a frontal blow was likely to protract the battle. Shifting efforts to another direction also required much time, for it involved negotiating a highly marshy terrain. Having thoroughly assessed the situation and calculated the time, Colonel Alexandrov decided to strike at the flank of a strong point blocking the road. Combining advance with accurate fire, the infantrymen captured the strong point by a swift thrust and rushed towards the station. They approach-



ed it at the moment when a nazi column started deploying to assume the defensive. Surprise actions from several directions decided the outcome of the battle. Having sustained considerable losses, the enemy had to withdraw. Thus, the regiment fulfilled the assigned mission in the shortest time possible.

In modern conditions, when forces are completely motorised and provided with powerful long-range destruction weapons and also with automatic and computing equipment, the time factor has assumed a qualitatively new significance. This can be explained by the increased speed and intensity of combat activity of all components in the intricate and multi-faceted military organism, by the increased possibility of sudden changes for the worse in the situation and of quick transition from one form or method of combat operations to another, and also by their wider spatial scope. These characteristic features of modern battle determine the importance of high operativeness in the work of commanders and staffs, and of mobility in troop control.

Experience has shown the importance for the commander to use the time factor to advantage. Numerous examples could be cited when subunits inferior to the opposing side in weapons and equipment emerged victorious owing to the ability to forestall the enemy in deploying for combat and dealing a fire blow. The time factor makes itself particularly felt in a meeting engagement. This kind of battle is a sort of competition of the opposing sides in speed, manoeuvrability, quickness of committing forces to action and exploiting the success, which, all other conditions being equal, attends those who are capable of forestalling the enemy in deploying, opening fire and striking a blow.

In their turn precise operational and tactical calculations cannot be made without knowledge of enemy tactics to disclose his concept and intentions. All actions in this respect are based on the commander's foresight and purposefulness. The more exhaustive the forecast and the more accurate the calculations, the more practicable the decision taken will be and the fewer corrections the commander and staff will have to make in the battle plan. Hence combat actions will be more organised, thus providing a greater chance to gain time and achieve victory.

In the winter and spring, when combat operations may be largely affected by environmental conditions, all-round assessment of the terrain, e. g. state of roads, rivers, marshes, etc., is particularly important. Of no less significance is the ability to foresee changes in the weather: sudden

heavy rain or snow-falls, sand storms and the like. Practice shows that miscalculations in assessing the environmental conditions often lead to setbacks. During an exercise, for example, a motorised infantry battalion had the mission to perform a march in order to destroy an advancing "enemy" column in a meeting engagement. Having specified the mission and assessed the situation, the Bn CO determined the time of approaching the line of a likely encounter with the "enemy." He intended to approach the line and strike a blow at the column when the latter was negotiating a marshy sector of the terrain, which would prevent it from speedy deployment for combat.

In the beginning everything went according to plan. Suddenly the weather deteriorated. A blizzard rose. Snow covered the ground quickly, making the road along which the battalion was advancing almost impassable. The subunits' rate of advance decreased sharply. The battalion failed to reach the designated line in the allotted time, and hence to forestall the "enemy." The loss of time required many additional efforts to bring about a turning point in the situation in order to carry out the assigned mission. This example shows the importance of correctly assessing weather conditions.

The problem of rational time distribution is also of great significance in an offensive. The success of an attack depends directly on swiftness, surprise and correct choice of the time of passing over to the offensive.

A swift and sudden blow creates favourable conditions for economising manpower and equipment, destroying the enemy piecemeal, and achieving a speedy and uninterrupted advance to a great depth. In this situation time becomes a factor objectively increasing the possibilities of the attackers. However, the advantage of the attacking side is not materialised automatically. It takes effort and creative initiative, and requires that the commander should reveal a vulnerable spot in the enemy combat formation so as to attack him when he least expects it.

To this end, different methods are used. The commander's tactical skill consists in the ability to act according to the situation in every concrete case, using effectively the weapons and equipment at his disposal. Thus, to achieve surprise it is advisable to use night and complicated weather conditions (fog, heavy rain). It is also advantageous for the attackers to strike the enemy when he is relieving his subunits.

It should be noted, however, that swift actions are bound to bear fruit only when adequate secu-



...rity and logistical support are ensured, and if swiftness does not affect the quality of troop control. The striving to gain time does not mean taking insufficiently substantiated decisions or haste in organising cooperation with attached and supporting subunits, for such actions will result in unnecessary losses and waste of time.

The time factor also plays a great role in defensive battle. As in other types of battle, it must be considered in combination with the concrete situation: e. g. enemy's actions, terrain, climate, time of the day or season of the year. For instance, the time of readiness of the fire system and engineer obstacles is calculated so as to ensure timely repulsion of the attack. This applies to echelonment of weapons and equipment, coordination of efforts in time, place and direction. In other words, everything must be done to make the defence highly active and build up intensity of fire on the enemy as he approaches the forward edge, and to counterattack him resolutely from different directions in the event of his penetrating the combat formations.

The defence should always contain elements of surprise for the enemy. By fire and manoeuvre and resolute actions subunits should strive to increase the stability and activity of the defence, to mislead the enemy as to the system of fire and mine fields, layout of the forward edge, positions of friendly troops and materiel and of second echelons and reserves. This is indispensable to make the enemy prematurely deploy for combat, to slow down the attack and prevent him from manoeuvring, thereby depriving him of the prospects of success and creating favourable conditions for passing over to the offensive.

In all types of battle gaining time depends directly on the men's, commanders' and staffs' combat skills and their ability to use every minute with maximum effect. The striving to gain time means working with maximum efficiency, displaying initiative, military cunning and resourcefulness, and searching for new ways of solving the tasks one is faced with.

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USE OF ARTILLERY AGAINST ANTI-TANK WEAPONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 16-18

[Article by Maf V. Aleshenko: "Use of Artillery Against Antitank Weapons"]


[Text]

Antitank fire, in the first place, fire of tanks, ATGMs, recoilless, self-propelled and tractor drawn artillery and grenade launchers before the FEBA and in the depth, closely coordinated with a system of mined obstacles and natural barriers, artillery fire and air attacks make up the basis of antitank defence. Besides, carrying out a continuous reconnaissance for the purpose of timely detection of enemy tanks and warning subunits of their advance and flexible fire manoeuvre are also of paramount importance.

All antitank weapons are used in coordination as regards purpose, place and time. The main principle of their use is concentration of the main efforts in the main tank-threatened directions. Most of the tanks, artillery, ATGMs and grenade launchers are located, as a rule, on the forward line of defence in company and platoon strong points and between them. The remaining weapons, located in the depth, serve to increase efforts and for deployment in case of necessity on organised fire lines.

Continuous killing zones, heavy density of antitank weapons and a developed system of obstacles create a powerful shield against advancing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. That is why one of the most important measures in preparing for and during an offensive is to organise the negotiation of antitank defences.

In all cases success is possible only if all available men and equipment are used for it and efficient cooperation is organised between them. In this struggle, the artillery plays, perhaps, the most significant role because in any situation, irrespective of meteorological conditions, time of the year and day, and on any terrain it is capable of effective action against the detected targets and installations. Besides, the increasing use of optical, instrumental and electronic means of artillery reconnaissance, usually supplemented by air reconnaissance data makes it possible to detect the fire positions of enemy antitank weapons with



greater accuracy and reliability, authenticity and to a greater depth.

Artillery is used against them uninterruptedly during the entire offensive. Here one can discern the following stages: breakthrough of the defences; pressing home the attack; repulsing counterattacks; commitment of second echelons and reserves to action; assault crossing of water barriers and consolidation on captured ground.

When planning combat actions one should take into consideration that the immediate objectives for artillery subunits are platoon strong points located in the first line and in the immediate depth of the defenders. A considerable proportion of the grenade launchers, recoilless guns, artillery, ATGMs, tanks and IFVs are located here. Concentrated fire of an artillery battalion or group of batteries from covered fire positions supplemented by direct gun fire at separate targets is considered the main type of artillery fire for destroying strong points.

Antitank weapons located outside strong points present either pinpoint targets (a single ATGM launcher, tank, IFV, etc.) or a measured objective (a battery of ATGMs, antitank guns, a tank or an IFV platoon).

Pinpoint targets are destroyed by self-propelled ATGM launchers, guns and also by direct fire from tanks. In this case less shells are spent and the mission is carried out in a shorter time.

In a number of cases pinpoint targets may be unobservable for artillery detailed for direct fire. In this case they are destroyed only by artillery firing from covered positions.

Antitank weapons constituting measured targets and located outside strong points, are destroyed by concentrated fire. One way of neutralising the antitank defence of a company strong point is shown on the sketch. In the given example a Mts Inf Bn is reinforced with an artillery battalion, a tank company, an ATGM battery and a mortar battery. Therefore the following order of firing is envisaged. The artillery neutralises three platoon strong points from covered positions. Weapons detailed for direct fire destroy stationary tanks, self-propelled guns, ATGM launchers, recoilless guns and CP-OP located in and outside platoon strong points.

Of considerable importance is the detailed planning of fire at antitank reserves and also at tanks and IFVs of second echelons. Destruction of these objectives hampers and in a number of cases completely prevents enemy manoeuvre to cover the threatened directions and thus considerably weakens the defence.

The artillery subunits at the disposal of the superior commander are also used for firing at location areas of antitank reserves, mobile obstacle detachments, second echelon tanks and IFVs. Since these targets are usually not observable from the ground, helicopters are used for fire adjustment. Thus continuous observation of neutralised objectives is secured and in case of their displacement to escape fire all necessary corrections are made on the spot.

Destruction of enemy control posts, radars and night vi-

sion devices helps weaken the enemy's defence stability. It results in disruption of the antitank weapons system and their less effective use. To carry out such missions artillery battalions and batteries located on covered positions and also artillery detailed for direct fire may be attached.

Besides destroying various objectives the artillery can lay smoke screens. As a result of screening with smoke or blinding of separate fire emplacements, observation points, reconnaissance points, strong points, positions of antitank weapons and reserves when they pass over to a counter-attack considerable difficulties in fire and subunit control are presented.

Actions in the depth of the defences and high rates of advance also depend to a great extent on the effective use of artillery against antitank weapons. Their destruction in the concentration areas, during manoeuvre on firing lines and lines of deployment is effected by concentrated and barrage fire. Artillery attacks are also practised during this period.

During the offensive the fire capabilities of the artillery against antitank weapons increase. This results from the fact that in the dynamics of battle, the fire for destroying and neutralising is aimed mainly at openly located and well observed targets. In this case a greater number of targets can be destroyed with less ammunition expenditure.

When planning fire missions the efforts are distributed in such a way as to secure reliable neutralisation of detected enemy installations. At the same time the action of the artillery against antitank weapons is not considered as something isolated, apart from the missions carried out by the tank and motorised infantry subunits. As it is carried out by all forces of the attackers it is important to ensure reliable cooperation throughout the whole depth to which the mission is carried out. Prominent significance here attaches to careful distribution of targets between the artillery, tank and motorised infantry subunits with due account of the situations. Besides, fire of the artillery on covered positions with that of direct fire weapons must be thoroughly coordinated. This makes it possible to carry out the assigned missions more effectively and in the maximum short periods.

In the interests of maintaining uninterrupted and close cooperation and promptly destroying newly detected targets, artillery observers are located in the attackers' battle formations.

Unified signals and a reliable communication are established between subunits used to destroy enemy antitank defence.

Success against antitank weapons also depends on the skill of the artillery subunits' personnel, the ability of the commanders to carry out the assigned missions conforming their actions to circumstances in every concrete case.

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WW II DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN KURSK AREA DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 41-43

[Article by Col Z. Aleksandrov, Cand, Sc. (History) under the rubric "Military History": "High Activity in Defense"]

[Text]

A distinctive feature of the Soviet forces' defence during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was its high activity. Units in defence tried to inflict maximum losses on the enemy, to oppose their counter-manoeuve to his manoeuvre, to mislead and stun the enemy by surprise methods of defensive operations.

High activity in defence was achieved, first of all, by a constant action against the enemy's men and equipment by all types of fire and air blows.

The Soviet Command strove to use fire against the enemy beginning from extreme ranges. As the time of the enemy offensive drew nearer the power of the artillery fire was increased. Separate enemy columns and groupings were destroyed by blows from aircraft, long-range artillery bombardment and concentrated artillery fire.

So as not to reveal the entire fire system beforehand the firing was carried out by duty and roving batteries (battalions).

Artillery counterbombardment was the main method of action against the enemy on the approaches to the Soviet defences. Its efficiency depended to a great extent on reconnaissance data being obtained in good time. Operations of the forces of the Central Front during the Battle of Kursk is a case in point. On the night of July 4, 1943 a reconnaissance group of the 15th Infantry Division took prisoner a sapper from an enemy infantry division in the Verkhneye Tagino area. He testified that the nazi troops would pass over to the offensive at 0400 hrs. This was also confirmed by other types of reconnaissance. At 0210 hrs 20-minute artillery bombardment was begun on the order of the front commander.

Thousands of shells and mines were fired on

the enemy infantry and tank formations poised to attack, on his artillery batteries, observation posts, staffs, ammunition and fuel depots. At 0435 hrs (five minutes after the beginning of the enemy artillery bombardment) a 30-minute artillery counterbombardment was repeated. As a result the enemy suffered considerable losses in men and guns, and control and cooperation in his units was disrupted. The offensive of the nazi forces was delayed two and a half hours.


The effectiveness of the artillery fire increased considerably if it began suddenly, was massed and carried out in combination with other means of destruction against the main enemy grouping. Thus, at 0800 hrs on March 29, 1943 the artillery observers of the 30th Army, which was holding defences on the bank of the Volga west of Rzhev, detected nazi tanks taking up assault positions under cover of a wood (see Sketch No. 1).

The army command immediately ordered to prepare an artillery bombardment (140 guns per two kilometre sector) of lines between the edge of the wood and the village of Pogorelki. Direct fire guns were also put into combat readiness.

At 0900 hrs nearly a hundred enemy tanks followed by infantry in two-echelon battle formation advanced from the edge of the wood. When they approached the first line the artillery opened up



Sketch No. 1



with a barrage. A rocket mortar battalion fired one volley. When the dust and smoke of the explosions cleared away, several tanks were seen to have been put out of action and the Infantry was withdrawing in disorder. The rest of the enemy tanks broke through the forward edge of the Soviet defences and rushed to Pogorelki. At that moment guns of an antitank strong point opened up point-blank fire at them. In some minutes over 30 enemy fighting vehicles were destroyed. The enemy attack petered out.

An important factor for achieving high activity in defence was the defenders' ability to impose their will on the enemy, to make him wage battle in disadvantageous conditions.


For this purpose, while the defence was still being organised, the grouping of men and equipment was determined in accordance with a concept of active operations, advanced, switch and intermediate positions and a system of engineer, mainly mine obstacles, were created. Taking advantage of the prepared defences and the features of the terrain, the Soviet forces forced the enemy to advance in a direction on which he was unable to use his manpower and equipment in the proper way and various surprises awaited him. For example, in a number of cases the enemy found himself in killing grounds and sustained heavy losses. On July 8, 1943 units of the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army prepared a killing ground in the area of the inhabited localities of Zabolotye, Samodurovka, Teploye on the second line of defence of the northern wing of the Kursk Bulge (see Sketch No. 2). Here the enemy hurled nearly 200 tanks against the Soviet forces. But at the very beginning of the offensive, having been carried away by the desire to pursue several tank companies, which had been laying in ambush, the enemy found himself in a killing

ground organised by three tank brigades. Coming under fire from three sides he lost nearly 60 tanks and withdrew to the line of departure.

Fairly frequent use was made of such a form of action as organising a dummy forward line of defence occupied by small forces. When the enemy surmounted it he was subjected to strong blows before the real forward line and suffered heavy losses. Thus, when defending the Sandomierz bridgehead in July-August 1944, the 39th Guards Infantry Division in order to organise a dummy forward line of defence withdrew to three kilometres from the previously occupied line in order to organise a dummy forward line of defence. The dummy forward line was held by only two infantry companies reinforced with artillery and mortars. These subunits were constantly moving and delivering intensive fire. Besides, their actions were actively supported by artillery from the main defensive zone. As a result the enemy was misled.

On August 6, the nazis passed over to the offensive. Before this they carried out a 40-minute artillery bombardment of the dummy forward line. Having launched an attack the enemy took two full hours to overcome resistance of the two infantry companies supported by artillery fire. When the enemy approached the true forward line he was met with powerful fire and did not manage to break through the division's defences.

Sketch No. 2



High activity in defence was also achieved by manoeuvring with men and weapons.

Manoeuvre was carried out to reinforce units and formations operating in the direction of the enemy main blow and to create a grouping of manpower and weapons intended to deliver a

Rapid and effective manoeuvre with fire was achieved by preparing beforehand 40 sectors of concentrated fire, one sector of moving and six

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The experience of the past and present day combat experience convincingly proves the correctness of this conclusion.

## MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

### MARSHAL SU K. MOSKALENKO DISCUSSES MILITARY SKILL

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 2-6

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Moskalenko, deputy minister of defense of the USSR: "Military Skill"]

[Text]

The contemporary level of development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their combat potential, noted by L. I. Brezhnev in the Report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress, are directly connected with the training standard of the army and navy personnel and with the level of their military skill.

Military skill means high professional and special preparedness of each serviceman, of the whole personnel of subunits, units, ships and of the Armed Forces as a whole for the accomplishment of combat missions and the discharge of their duties. The degree of skill is determined by the knowledge and practical habits of the personnel. High military skill is that level of moral, political, psychological, tactical, fire and technical training which allows the most effective use of weapons and equipment in battle in different situations, in different seasons of the year and at different times of the day for the purpose of winning victory over a strong and technically well-equipped enemy.

This factor was one of the most important sources of our epoch-making victory over nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. In the fire of battle millions of servicemen constantly perfected their knowledge and practical skills, tempered their will and became experts at their jobs. On the ground and in the air, on water and under water they acted skillfully and with fortitude.

For instance, fighter pilot A. I. Pokryshkin shot down 59 enemy planes in air combat. He was well conversant with the capabilities of his aircraft, piloted it excellently and used new tactical

methods. His battle-tested formula of victory was "height-speed-manoeuvre-fire." His methods were adopted by other fighters. 30 pilots under his command whom the famous Soviet ace had trained and taught became Heroes of the Soviet Union, three of them were awarded this title twice.

The antitank artillery battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. I. Logvinenko was famed for its skilled actions in fighting the enemy. In one engagement alone the battery crews shot up and set on fire 42 nazi armoured vehicles. It may seem impossible, but it is proved by documents kept in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence. On July 9, 1941 the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper published the article "Logvinenko's Battery Shot Up 42 Enemy Tanks" devoted to this feat.

We may cite a great number of examples of servicemen of all the fighting services and arms of the Armed Forces displaying individual and collective skill. During the war the Communist Party demanded of the army and navy cadres that they fight on a level with the requirements of modern military science, strictly adhere to the laws of war and creatively apply the principles of Soviet military art.

Following these directions, marshals, generals, admirals and officers effectively directed the armed struggle of unprecedented scale and scope. Strategic, operational and tactical planning was purposeful, flexible and practical. Soviet military leaders displayed a creative approach to the development of the forms and methods of combat.



Their skill was manifested in the ability to achieve surprise in offensive operations, in timely preparation and skilful use of strategic and operational reserves, in the massing of forces on the most decisive sectors, in the organisation of continuous cooperation, active and resolute actions of troops, and in their all-round support. The bulk of strategic operations were original in concept and characterised by high skill in manoeuvring, flexibility and firm troop control.

No doubt, the rich wartime experience has not lost its significance even today. At the same time the scientific and technological revolution and its consequences in the military field, such as the appearance of radically new weapons and forms and methods of combat, have brought about fundamental changes in military science and set a great number of problems pertaining to troop training and education which have never been set before.

Military science has its own logic of development, its own internal structure. And it is very important that this structure, the organisation of forces and the system of their training should correspond to the latest achievements of science and technology and provide their rapid implementation and effective use. This applies both to combat training and to special, operational and tactical training.

The rapid development of weapons and combat materiel, and provision of the army and navy with their new types have led to a rapid growth of the number of military technical specialities. Now they total some two thousand (during the Second World War there were less than 160 of them). Besides, it is necessary to take into account the fact that they have become much more complicated and that the demands made on the skill of the men servicing the equipment have increased immeasurably.

Only servicemen with all-round training can control missile and radio electronic systems, pilot supersonic airships, steer nuclear-powered submarines and make efficient use of other modern equipment in battle. In the Soviet Armed Forces these requirements are successfully fulfilled, and this is due in no small degree to the raised level of general education and increased technical knowledge of the Soviet people, especially the youth.

The high training level and combat skill of the personnel is attested by the fact that in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Defence Forces, tank units and formations, the overwhelming majority

of officers are 1st and 2nd class specialists, experts at their jobs. By the way, many officers, generals and admirals were awarded Orders and medals for their services in mastering modern sophisticated weapons and equipment, some being honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the discharge of my official duties I often have to attend different tactical exercises with field firing and missile launching. As a rule, the servicemen of all the fighting services and arms demonstrate high combat skill there. Field, air and naval training standards as well as the teamwork of units and formations have improved. Efficiency in using contemporary types of weapons and solving combat and training missions has increased. Cases have become common when many regular soldiers and sergeants successfully perform the duties of officers. These facts demonstrate the high technical training standard and professional skill of the servicemen.

All this is very well, but the demands on the personnel's military skill, on the ability of commanders to control the units and formations entrusted to them are constantly rising. And what we could accept yesterday cannot satisfy us today. Nowadays the criteria of military skill possess their own qualitative peculiarities, they are becoming more rigorous.

First, in a modern war, should one be unleashed by the imperialists, it would be impossible to complete the training of the personnel in the course of combat operations as was practised before. From the very first hours combat actions will assume an active and decisive character and will proceed without any lulls. The personnel will have to fight with only those habits and skills that have been acquired in peacetime. That is why it is very important today to attain a high level of combat and political training of the personnel and to ensure their complete readiness for fighting in modern conditions.

Second, in training and educating the servicemen one should proceed from the fact that in modern conditions the leading role in the military field belongs chiefly to collective weapons. If in the past somebody was not good enough at handling his rifle or sabre this could not very much affect the outcome of the battle because his friends could compensate for this deficiency by their accurate fire. A missile is another matter. It is serviced by a collective of men in which every member does a very important job, part of the common task. In these conditions the inability or



carelessness of one man can lead to grave consequences and may result in failure to accomplish the mission assigned. In our days military skill means mainly the skill of a combat collective. This skill is based on excellent knowledge of the weapons and equipment, on proficient and coordinated actions of many men, on their high self-discipline and implicit readiness to fulfil orders. So the role of the man in combat has increased still further.

Third, the contents of some training and educational principles, including the principle of teaching the troops what is required in war in conditions closely resembling those of real combat, have been enriched.

What will be needed in a modern war should one be unleashed by the imperialists? Readiness for swift, decisive and surprise actions using all available resources; the ability to fight successfully in spite of the enemy's use of electronic countermeasures and to accomplish missions when the forces are greatly dispersed and carry out intensive action both from the front and in the depth of the enemy positions. The art to conduct meeting engagements and fighting in mountains far from losing its significance, has acquired even greater importance. Of particular importance are the ability to cover great distances in a minimum time, efficient and well-organised cooperation of units and subunits, the ability to destroy targets with the first shot or missile, in the first air or naval attack. That is why in modern combat field, air and naval training, and especially their core—operational-tactical training—play an exceptionally important role in the whole system of troop training.

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of Defence of the USSR D. F. Ustinov points out: "The main thing in troop combat training is carrying out tactical and fire training missions, perfecting fighting methods. And not simply carrying out these missions but doing so definitely with a high degree of proficiency."

The most important condition for further improving the military skill and the tactical and fire training level of the troops is the perfection of officers training, because the officers play the leading role in training and educating the men. All categories of servicemen should perfectly master the equipment and weapons, and this applies in the first place to the officers. They must know how to get the best out of the weapons, look for and find new, more effective methods of

waging battle, be able to control subunits, units and formations skilfully. Their duty, in the light of the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress, is to improve the style of work, be an example for their subordinates in everything.

Life and practice convincingly prove that the best results in combat and political training are achieved by those commanders who are always guided by the principles based on the theory and practice of Soviet military construction.

To increase the efficiency of the personnel's combat training, the Soviet Armed Forces constantly improve the training aids and materials of units and subunits, intensively introduce simulators, complexes of simulators and other technical facilities. At each lesson commanders strive to create a situation requiring of their subordinates maximum effort and full use of the combat capabilities of the weapons and equipment.

The role of the commander, especially of the regimental commander and ship's commanding officer, in training and educating the personnel is very important and very responsible. The quality and efficiency of the fulfilment of combat-training missions depend on how well the commander has organised the training and education of his subordinates. The commander must be a highly competent expert in method and at the same time be able to control units and formations skilfully in combat in any weather conditions and at any time of the day. For this he should know well the character and nature of modern warfare and combat, have full knowledge of own and enemy forces, their strong and weak points, know own weapons and equipment as well as any weapons and equipment that might be used by the enemy and, on this basis, be able to defeat the enemy.

Success greatly depends on the time factor. Not days and hours but minutes and even seconds decide nowadays the outcome of a battle. And this requires of the commander an exceptionally rapid response to any change in the situation, quick adoption of a decision and conveyance of missions to the forces and supervision of their implicit accomplishment. The significance of the commander's foresight, without which it is impossible to analyse deeply the situation and the incoming reconnaissance data and perform accurate calculations, has also increased.

What are the main lines and methods for improving the military skill and military art of our commanders? The most effective are prolonged


marches, sea cruises, flights, tours of duty, manoeuvres and exercises conducted in conditions closely resembling combat. Of special importance is the simultaneous conduct of command and staff, troop and special exercises on the terrain with the use of real control facilities and participation of troops. The importance of such joint exercises for enhancing the training level of officers, generals and admirals lies in the fact that they make it possible to work up, deeply and comprehensively, the problems of controlling diverse forces and weapons. Besides, such exercises contain an element of research in nature and offer the possibility to check in practice the operational and tactical training level of the personnel.

Implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress the Soviet servicemen concentrate their efforts on further enhancing the combat readiness which, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, is the crown of troops' combat skill and the key to victory in war. Every day in the life and activities of the forces, every hour of combat training must bring a real if only small success in raising combat readiness and perfecting military skill.

Thanks to the constant concern of the Party and the people for the Armed Forces the latter have at their disposal everything they need to accomplish the missions assigned. High is the level of combat skill of their personnel. Invincible is the combat power of the army and navy. But speaking about the combat power of our Armed Forces we do not mean, and this should be especially underlined, a threat to anybody. Everything done in our country to strengthen the combat power of the army and navy is limited by the requirements of necessary defence. It is a reply to aggressive preparations of imperialism.

Under cover of the myth of a "Soviet military threat" the leaders of the NATO aggressive bloc, the USA above all, are whipping up an unprecedented arms race. They have adopted the course of achieving superiority over the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. This is the reason why we are compelled to perfect our Armed Forces. The only goal of this perfection is to ensure the security of our country, our allies and friends.

Brought up by the Communist Party in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and utter devotion to the Socialist Motherland, the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces are honourably discharging their constitutional duty to guard the gains of socialism and peaceful labour of their people.



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## ARMED FORCES

### SERVICE REGULATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 62 pp 36-37

[Article by Col Yu. Ivanov: "Servicemen's Code of Life"]

[Text]

Of great importance for the successful solution of tasks facing the Soviet Army and Navy are the Military Regulations, which considerably promote the cohesion, efficiency and teamwork of military collectives and contribute to further strengthening the combat readiness of subunits, units, ships and the Armed Forces as a whole.

The Military Regulations have played a tremendous role in the creation, development and enhancement of the might of the Soviet state's Armed Forces. They fully reflect Lenin's ideas on the genuinely popular character of the Red Army and on the basic principles of Soviet military construction.

The existing Military Regulations came into force in 1975. The preceding regulations adopted in the 1960s corresponded to the level of development of the Armed Forces of that period. Since then the USSR has made great strides on the road of building the material and technical basis of communism. The Armed Forces have undergone qualitative changes too. The rapid development of science and technology has worked radical changes in the military field and had a determining influence on the armament and organisation of the army and navy, on the methods of warfare and of the personnel's instruction and education. Accordingly, a new Law on Universal Military Service was passed, a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet instituting a new category of servicemen — *praporshchiks* and *mitchmans* — was issued, and a number of decisions and resolutions of the CPSU and the Soviet Government not reflected in the regulations were adopted. Army life and the activity of the

forces insistently called for a revision of the regulations.

The 1975 regulations were an important step in the development of the army and navy, in enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces and strengthening the Soviet country's defence potential. The regulations begin with the text of the Oath of Allegiance. When taking the oath servicemen swear to defend the Motherland courageously and competently, with dignity and honour, sparing neither their blood nor even their life to defeat the enemy.

Though differing in purpose, all military regulations are aimed at achieving a single goal — ensuring strict order in the army and navy, providing common guidelines for the personnel's instruction and education and preparing and conducting combat operations in accordance with the requirements of modern science and military art.

Let us consider the principal propositions of the existing Soviet regulations.

The Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces regulate the personnel's everyday combat training and leisure, lay down the servicemen's general and special duties, the interrelations between them, the procedure for issuing and carrying out orders, establish the rules of military courtesy and servicemen's behaviour and of daily routine in military units. The Regulations set forth the way the daily detail should perform interior service duties, and contain prescriptions for the quartering of the personnel, the organisation of medical services, for assembling at combat alert, reveille and for announcements. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the

USSR Supreme Soviet of May 27, 1977 the Regulations begin with the text of the National Anthem of the USSR. They also contain clauses on the unit colours.

The Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces lay down the essence and basic requirements of Soviet military discipline. Article 1 of the Regulations says: "Military discipline is the strict and precise observation by all servicemen of the order and rules established by military laws and regulations." The Regulations list the kinds of commendations and punishments for different categories of servicemen, commanders' and chiefs' disciplinary rights, and set forth the procedure for lodging and examining complaints, proposals and applications. Soviet servicemen's patriotic duty consists in exemplary observance of the requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations, assistance to commanders and chiefs for strengthening discipline and maintaining strict military order, and in displaying high personal responsibility and initiative.

The Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces lay down the organisation and procedure for performing garrison and guard duties, formulate the rights and duties of garrison officials and servicemen performing these duties, and expound the order of carrying out garrison activities with troop participation and of laying wreaths at monuments and graves of fighting men who fell in battles for the freedom and independence of the Motherland. The Regulations set forth the duties of sentries and guards detailed for duty at guard posts. The Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations play an important role in the life of the forces, for they promote high military discipline and exemplary order in the garrison.

The Drill Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces describe the actions of units and subunits in mounted and dismounted, line and march, and prebattle formations. They set forth the requirements for troops' drill practice, servicemen's duties before forming up and in formation, drill evolutions with and without weapons, the procedure for saluting and holding a review. Excellent knowledge of these regulations and competent execution of their requirements help servicemen to develop disciplinedness, efficiency and military bearing, and to make effective use of the capabilities of modern weapons and equipment for carrying out combat training tasks and ensuring the forces' combat readiness.

The Soviet Navy Regulations, along with the above-mentioned regulations, regulate the com-

bat activity and leisure of Soviet navymen. The Regulations describe the functional duties of seamen, starshinas, mitchmens and officers and lay down the rules for the ship's details performing service duties.

Individual fighting arms of the USSR Armed Forces have, besides regulations, field manuals. Reflecting the combat experience of the Soviet Army and Navy and the achievements of Soviet military art, they determine the actions of an individual serviceman, a subunit, unit or ship in different combat situations taking into consideration the use of the modern weapons and combat equipment.

Also existing in the forces are manuals on individual kinds of combat training, which set forth the requirements for and methods of conducting combat operations in modern warfare.

The articles and clauses of military regulations are scientifically substantiated, they have been confirmed by the forces' practical activities and the experience of instruction and education of the personnel over many years. One of the main principles of the regulations is to teach the troops everything required in battle, creating training situations closely approximating real combat. This principle is implemented during lessons, field exercises and sea cruises, and in the tactical, drill, fire and special training. Modern battle calls not only for good knowledge of weapons and equipment and the ability to handle them competently, but also for immense moral and physical effort on the part of the servicemen; it represents a duel of minds, high combat and technical training standard, poise and staunchness, courage and gallantry of those who are at missile launcher panels, steer ships and pilot aircraft, drive tanks and APCs, make crossings and use small arms in battle. Therefore, military regulations presuppose that the decisive role in victory is played by men who can handle weapons and equipment competently, are steeled morally and physically, are convinced in the righteousness of the cause they are fighting for, are irreconcilable to hostile propaganda and are capable of keeping military and state secrets at any time and in any situation.

The all-arms military regulations direct the entire activity of the Soviet Armed Forces, but their significance is far more wider. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always paid much attention to the ideological steeling of army and navy personnel, to instilling in them moral, political and combat qualities such as high political consciousness, love for the Socialist Motherland, readiness to defend it selflessly, discipline and

efficiency, honesty and truthfulness, vigilance and combat readiness, physical steeling, fortitude and staunchness, courage and resolution, will for victory, the ability to endure all the hardships and privations of military service, initiative and resourcefulness, friendship and mutual assistance, readiness to come to the aid of one's comrades in battle, etc.

Military regulations help servicemen to develop these qualities under the guidance of commanders and political workers. Army and navy service steels servicemen's will and character and develops the ability to display initiative and resolution in the most complicated and dangerous situations of modern battle. The more persistent a serviceman is in fulfilling the requirements of the manuals and regulations, the quicker he acquires the qualities indispensable for carrying out combat missions.

Thus, Soviet all-arms regulations are aimed at fostering high moral, political and combat qualities in the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. By complying with the requirements of the regulations strictly and steadfastly, Soviet servicemen become steeled ideologically, improve their knowledge and skills, and develop the ability to overcome the hardships and privations of military service and to act competently and conscientiously in war.

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## GROUND FORCES

### PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF AIRBORNE TROOPS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 34-35

[Article by Col Sh. Nurullin under the rubric "The Making of a Soldier": "Tempering the Will"]

[Text]

A paratrooper's operations involve numerous difficulties. To cope with them, he must be strong-willed, brave and physically fit. He must have retentive memory, be quick in his reactions and possess all the qualities needed in an emergency situation in the enemy rear. It follows that the problem of psychological steeling is a problem of great significance in the airborne forces.

In solving this problem, an important role is played by political classes and the ideological and educational work carried out purposefully by commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisations. Such features as communist convictions, patriotism, proletarian internationalism and loyalty to combat traditions form the basis of the soldier's staunchness, courage and high combat activity.

Practically paratroopers develop all the necessary qualities on the jumping ground, during tactical exercises, at firing ranges and during physical training.

The jumping ground is intended for the men to work up the technique of preparing for parachute jumping, to develop volitional qualities, endurance and observation, to learn how to coordinate their movements and to improve their skills in surmounting natural obstacles and obstructions. They also train to operate radio sets, drive motor vehicles and to acquire other knowledge necessary for a paratrooper. Commanders try to organise training so as to arouse the men's keen interest in parachute jumping and to increase their self-confidence.

...One day paratroopers were practising jumping from a parachute tower. Senior Lieutenant Pikauskas carefully watched his subordinates. Some of the newly drafted men could hardly suppress their excitement and even kept their eyes closed when jumping. The senior lieutenant could have encouraged his men by word, but he was not sure this would be effective. Experience shows that in the circumstances one must use not words but actions. The commander provided for this in advance. He ordered the men to make plywood boards with large-size figures on them. Then he lined up his men and said:

"Now we are going to carry out an experiment. A man standing near the tower will show you these boards, each of them for a second. Your task is to mark what is shown on them."

The platoon commander expected, and not without reason, that by this additional task he would distract the men's attention and thus dispel their fears.

To begin with, Senior Lieutenant Pikauskas himself climbed the tower. While jumping he saw a board with a figure on it and cried out: "Four!" He was followed by his subordinates. Private Kazakov substituted "seven" for "three" by mistake during his jump and thus made his mates laugh. The commander ordered silence and explained that Kazakov had evidently omitted to look downwards, as is often the case with the newcomers. The senior lieutenant again climbed the tower to explain to the soldier once more how to perform the jump. After that the soldier's actions were quite correct.

At the end of the training the men had already gained a certain skill which enabled the commander to organise contests for the best jumping technique. All this imparted a competitive spirit to the training.

The entire range of paratroopers' actions from boarding the plane till landing is mastered on a mock-up aircraft, a suspension system or a parachute spring-board. Training of this kind allows them to gain various skills and helps them preserve their valuable moral and psychological qualities.

Paratroopers have to perform jumping in full combat equipment both day and night, in normal and bad weather, in any season of the year and on different terrains. Practical training contributes to develop their will-power and endurance and helps them adapt themselves to any situation.

When training in the field commanders do their best to create a situation closely resembling that of real battle. Most profitable is training on an unfamiliar terrain. For this the commander first designates a training area on the map far from inhabited localities, usually in mountainous, wooded

or marshy country. Brought by transport planes the paratroopers have to live there for some time adapting themselves to these conditions. They learn how to provide shelter for themselves on snow-covered or wet ground or how to light a fire concealing it from the enemy observation. Naturally, in these conditions the paratroopers have to display know-how and resourcefulness in overcoming the difficulties.

They train to negotiate mountain torrents on cable lines stretched over the obstacles, to climb steep slopes or to keep their balance, without feeling giddy, on logs installed high over a ditch filled with water. This is the paratroopers' daily routine, the severe school of army life. One more item on the school curriculum is to be "run over" by tanks.

...The platoon arrived at the tankodrome. On a signal from the exercise director one tank headed for the men. The paratrooper took up his position at the ready in a trench. The multi-ton vehicle approached him at high speed firing blank shots. When the tank had reached the appropriate distance, the man threw a practice grenade at it. When the tank had passed overhead he threw a second grenade at its engine compartment. Then, after the fighting vehicle had turned and reversed its course towards another track, the paratrooper ran up to the track to take up the prone position there. When the tank had approached to a distance of 10-15 metres, the soldier, now being in a dead zone, hurled one more grenade at the tank's tracks.

The paratroopers are also taught how to put mines under tank's tracks and to destroy armoured vehicles by rocket launcher fire. Gradually they become accustomed to the effect produced by tanks approaching their positions at full speed and delivering unceasing fire; this helps them to get rid of their fears.

The commander's personal example is extremely important for developing the will-power, resolve and courage of his subordinates. During one exercise the paratroopers were working up the fire-fighting technique. When the platoon commander Senior Lieutenant Zigayev saw that some inexperienced soldiers were losing their head he ordered the men to follow him and himself began to extinguish the fire. Each time an exercise was held the men gained new skills, increased their self-confidence, became more composed and finally reached the level of experienced soldiers.

Paratroopers learn how to fight in burning buildings, which also greatly contributes to their psychological steeling. It is not easy to operate in a house in flames. Poisonous smoke suffocates the men and interferes with their orientation. The situation may be still more complicated by the fact that some staircases lack steps, the floors of some rooms collapse causing the man to fall from a 3-m height in the darkness (onto a mat). In these circumstances the paratrooper frequently has to engage in hand-to-hand fighting, to put out flames on his own clothes and those of his mates, to render aid to the "wounded" or to take "prisoners."

Paratroopers must be physically fit and possess endurance to overcome the great moral and psychological strain of modern battle. The great variety of tasks engendered by the combat situation makes it necessary for paratroopers to achieve all-round physical fitness.

In the airborne forces daily combat training begins with morning exercises lasting for an hour. The soldiers run a cross-country race, work on apparatus and perform special exercises. The commanders strive to diversify the training in order to vary the physical effort and thus achieve the best results. Here is an instance to illustrate this. One company went to the gymnasium in full uniform and carrying weapons. They put their submachine guns in the gun rack and began warming up. They went round the perimeter of the hall, accelerating their pace. Suddenly an air alert signal was given. The men immediately fell prone on the floor. Then they were ordered to stand up and to continue moving till a new signal sounded.

The platoon then divided into two sections: one approached the horizontal bar and the other the parallel bars. Junior Sergeant Kashirin brought his subordinates to a spring-board on which they were to work up acrobatic jumping. At the beginning their jumps were simple: being tossed off through the air they landed on both feet. Then their mission was complicated: immediately after landing they were to roll first once and then twice. After that the men proceeded to the second series of jumps which they performed in the same sequence but carrying a submachine gun. The third series was still more difficult: the soldier jumped up on the spring board, turned a somersault and finally stabbed at a target with his knife. The instructor carefully watched the men's actions, the accuracy of their stabs and their landing.

The gymnastics apparatus were usually changed during the training.

The gymnasium is provided with a stage on which the men can train with a bar. In one of the corners of the hall there are heavy ammunition boxes. The soldiers are ordered to carry them to the appropriate place on specified physical training days. They like this strenuous and diverse training. Soon after their arrival in the unit they change beyond recognition. This is usually proved by their physical inspection showing considerable improvement in their physical fitness.

When off duty paratroopers willingly attend sports groups. They also take part in the sports competitions frequently held in the units. The combined event with parachute jumping is especially popular. It includes a group jump for touch-down accuracy and a 5-km forced march. On the track the paratroopers carry out target practice with submachine guns and grenades and then carry a "wounded" man a distance of 100 metres. All the contestants of the combined event carry their weapons and other fighting equipment with them.

The whole process of psychological steeling in the airborne forces is aimed at developing in the men a strong will, gallantry, courage and staunchness — the qualities most valuable for them.

## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### TRAINING OF RADAR OPERATORS DISCUSSED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Lt Col V. Obukhov: "Complex Radar Training"]

[Text]

A great number of enemy planes were operating simultaneously in a radar subunit zone, some of them carrying out raids under cover of blind spots located near the lower boundary of the radar-scanned area. In this situation even the slightest slip could bring about failure to track targets and, consequently, erroneous radar information. Despite the acute time shortage, sudden changes in the air situation and temporary absence of information on individual manoeuvring targets, the radar operators succeeded in providing the command post and subunits of the Air Defence Forces with the necessary data in good time. This was made possible primarily because the commander had succeeded in training his subordinates to a high degree of proficiency and competently directed them in the training battle.

In the subunit every method of radar reconnaissance is worked up, with special attention given to improving methods of searching for, detecting and tracking a large number of targets operating in a wide range of altitudes and speeds and using intensive jamming. Simulation equipment is indispensable for creating such conditions.

At lessons radar operators have to carry out combat training missions with "inoperative" radar stages and units and with "damaged" communication channels, thus enabling each specialist to develop the ability to act efficiently in a complicated situation. This also helps commanders to improve their skills in distributing the loads among teams correctly, using communication fa-

cilities rationally and choosing the most operative and reliable information source.

Success also depends to a great extent on working up thoroughly all elements of handling the flow of radar information. Using radar of different ranges proves most useful in this respect.

During an exercise there may arise the problem of redundant radar information. This can be remedied by using the relevant automatic equipment.

Much is done in radar subunits to improve and standardise the methods of collecting data on the air situation, and processing and transmitting it in good time. To this end, radar teams are trained to handle great numbers of targets with obligatory solution of conflicting situations. Simultaneously, standardised commands, instructions and target designations are systematised and checked in practice. The commander sees to it that the personnel know by heart all control signals and the actions they call for.

To achieve high efficiency and perfect teamwork in complicated situations, commanders must know the actual abilities of each specialist, the capacity of communication channels and the radar capabilities.

Experience has shown that tracking great numbers of targets is particularly difficult for radar operators who have not been taught the basic ru-



les of work at the PPI screen from the very beginning. Even such an apparent trifle as ignorance of the optimal distance between the eyes and the indicator screen may affect the quality of an operator's work. If, for instance, this distance is greater than that prescribed, the eye's discriminating ability is reduced, and if it is smaller, the field of view is limited. As a result, the operator cannot cover the whole of the screen at a glance, and thus has to switch his attention constantly in order to examine the necessary sectors of the indicator. This, in turn, tires the eyes quickly and prevents the operator from grasping and assessing the general air situation.

Success attends those commanders who teach their subordinates to work within a radar team in complicated situations from the period of separate training, ensuring high organisation at lessons and correctly distributing the time allotted for target tracking.

Well thought-out planning also contributes greatly to high results. Radar subunits have made a practice of drawing up special plans of operators' practical actions in target tracking during the separate training period, providing for each specialist to track a certain number of real targets and have adequate training with the use of slides, simulators and trainers. Individual records are kept every day, the results being summed up at the end of the week. The plan for the next week is specified both as regards the increase in the number of targets, the obligatory number of real targets to be tracked and the number of training lessons. Simultaneously, radar operators acquire skills in determining the composition of multiple targets.

When tracking multiple targets, the operator must display utmost attentiveness and ability to detect the beginning of a manoeuvre by hardly discernible signs, for the commander will be unable to disclose the enemy's intentions unless he possesses reliable and complete information.

The detection and tracking of multiple targets have their specifics; in particular, their blips are much brighter than those of individual aircraft. The shape of the pulse also changes depending on the situation.

However, it is not always possible to determine the composition of the target at once proceeding from the outline of the blip, e. g. when aircraft

are flying in a compact formation. In this case reference instruments are most helpful.

Other kinds of training, e. g. using albums with photographs of screens in different air situations, are also practised in radar subunits. These albums help beginners to define the number of aircraft and to memorise the appearance of reflected signals. Subsequently they consolidate and perfect their skills with the aid of slides under the guidance of the radar chief. This method of training has proved very effective.

Practising operators' teamwork in handling large numbers of targets is an important stage of training, because radar teams include both experienced and young soldiers, each of the two categories having to reach the corresponding combat training standards. The commander distributes the targets among the trainees proceeding from this.

Demonstration lessons and tactical exercises held by an advanced subunit are a very effective form of preparing radar operators for action in complicated conditions.

The trainees are shown the sequence of actions in the event of a raid by a large number of aircraft. This is followed by a critique in which the performance of the team leader or his subordinates is analysed.

When training radar operators to act in a complicated situation, it is very important for the commander to understand perfectly the senior chief's concept, for otherwise he will be unable to realise the tactics of actions in the subunit's zone and to prepare himself and his subordinates in good time to repulse a mass air raid.

To make the utmost use of the equipment's capabilities, radar operators strive to reduce closing angles and reflection from the features of the terrain, and to check each radar's visibility range. A great effect is also produced by proper tuning of the equipment.

To carry out combat training missions successfully it is vital to determine the number of indicators required, the sequence of target search and coordinates read-out, to assign missions to each operator and to establish the procedure for transmitting information from each radar to the control post, the CP and so on.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS IN WW II DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 24-26

[Article by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) L. Shinkovich under the rubric "Weapons and Equipment": "Fighting Mines"]

[Text]


In its efforts not to allow Soviet warships to reach the Baltic Sea, Nazi Germany planned to blockade the Soviet fleet in the Gulf of Finland by installing mine barriers.


At the beginning of the war the Nazis laid anchored electrochemical mines and later acoustic, magnetic-acoustic, pressure and other mines. Thus, a magnetic mine with a 15 impulse delayed-action mechanism kept the mine's ignition circuit open up to six days.

In the summer of 1942 the average mine density in the Gulf of Finland

was from 98 to 177 mines per mile. The enemy installed vertical mine barriers of electrochemical, antenna and anchored influence mines. By the end of the year mine barriers practically merged into a continuous field totalling 25,000 mines. In the enemy opinion these obstacles in combination with patrols would create an insuperable obstacle for Soviet warships. But despite this the submarines of the Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet broke through to the Baltic Sea in 1942 and sank 39 enemy transport ships. The enemy

PST sweeper





Paravane sweeper with cutters

lost nine more transport ships on mines laid by Soviet submarines.

In the spring of 1943 the enemy managed to install continuous net defences in the Gulf of Finland. Next year the Hitlerites laid mines with hydrodynamic contact makers in combination with acoustic and magnetic ones which made mine sweeping very difficult.

In the final stage of the war in the Baltic Sea the nazis passed from the mine blockade to mining communication lines in an effort to deprive the Baltic Fleet of the possibility to render active assistance in the offensive operations of the Soviet Army. However, the Nazi Command overestimated the power of its mine weapon and underestimated the possibility of counteractions on the part of the Baltic Fleet. Thanks to the measures taken the enemy plans were frustrated.

Fighting the mine danger became the major problem of the Baltic Fleet and demanded maximum effort on the part of naval personnel, scientists, engineers and workers.

In the early period of the war the Baltic Fleet had only a small number of men and vessels for mine sweeping. For example, not less than 160 mine sweepers were needed to keep the area from Lepaya to Kronstadt clear of mines but only 42 mine sweepers were combat-ready.

With the transfer of various ships suitable for mine sweeping from different organisations to the fleet, the situation changed for the better. In a month and a half the number of the re-equipped mine sweepers increased to 63. New units and formations were formed and joined the anti-mine struggle. Thus, a mine-probing party was formed. Its mission was to search for and neutralise new enemy mines of hitherto unknown types.

In his mine schemes the enemy used various devices — traps aimed at keeping secret the mechanisms of the fuses. They exploded a small special charge which destroyed the devices without detonating the main filling of the mine. The fleet's miners displayed resourcefulness and courage, they discovered the main characteristics of the enemy mines and quickly determined the methods and means of fighting them. The divers showed great inventiveness and valour in searching for mines on the sea bottom and lifting them.

In order to decrease a danger of the ship's demolition on mines the Soviet seamen carried out degaussing of ships, observation of the place and time of enemy mine-laying and decreased the noise made by the ships and cruising at dead-slow speed.

Quite a few mines were destroyed by counterexplosion, by using contact and influence mine sweeping.


A great role in fighting magnetic mines was played by a group of scientists of the Leningrad Physical-Technological Institute headed by Professor A. Alexandrov (now President of the USSR Academy of Sciences) and future Academician I. Kurchatov. In July 1941 the group started installing degaussing coils on ships. They compensated and did not trigger off the mine's magnetic relay. In August 1941 Soviet scientists proposed the method of coil-less degaussing of submarines. This method, without precedent in the world practice was recognised as an invention and was patented.

After the first laying of mines by the enemy planes a wide network of mine observation points was established on the coast, on motor boats and boats equipped with compasses, direction finders, binoculars, watches, electric torches, logs for recording observations and mine stakes. During darkness hours mobile mine observation points were posted, usually anchored in exactly defined places.

Communication of the mine observation points with command posts was reliable. By means of a network of mine observation points the Soviet seamen managed to define pretty accurately the places and areas of mine laying and to carry out sweeping operations with a minimal difficulty. The Special Kronstadt Detachment of floating mine



Removing sweeper



observation points under the command of Senior Lieutenant N. Goloveshkin, coped excellently with its missions.

At first counterexplosions of mines and depth charges were the most common and considerably effective means of countering bottom influence mines. The blast wave of the underwater explosion ignited the proximity fuse or put it out of action. A preliminary sweeping by counterexplosions was carried out in the harbours of Tallinn, Ventspils, Lepays and others. However, great expenditure of explosives made it possible to go on using this method only for demining in harbours and ports, whose limited boundaries did not allow the use of sweepers.

The anchored contact mines were fished out by cutting contact sweepers which cut the mooring cable by means of cutters or broke it by explosive cutters; by removing (mines were caught by the mooring cable and towed to shallows); by net sweeping, in which mines floating on the surface were caught and then towed to the place of sweeper cleaning and then destroyed in a safe place.

To safeguard the ships against

anchored mines paravanes and chain safety devices lowered from the prow on both sides were used. The bottom influence mines were spotted by magnetic and acoustic sweepers.

Combat sweeping of influence mines showed that the principle of action of all sweepers had been chosen correctly. During the war, as the seamen gained experience, improvement of their construction became the main trend in their development.

Exploratory sweeping was carried out in the approach channels after appearance of enemy submarines or a raid of mine-carrying planes where they could plant bottom and anchored mines against the demagnetised ships. A check sweep by contact and influence sweepers in the approach channels was carried out before the ships set out from the base. Ships were preceded by mine sweepers in the mined areas when they had to be negotiated or when the channels followed were doubtful in respect of mine safety.

Here is an example how ships were escorted after sweepers during the evacuation of the Hanko naval base from October 26 to Decem-

ber 2, 1941. This operation was carried out in stormy weather conditions and incipient ice formation and in a complicated mine situation. The enemy had laid over 6,000 mines, both coasts of the Gulf of Finland were under enemy control, and his fleet's light forces, submarines, aviation and coast artillery were operating there.

Evacuation was carried out by several detachments and at different time. To reduce the loss of fighting and other ships by explosion on mines, those of light draught were used provided with special poles for pushing away mines, and sweepers and patrol craft had luminous buoys to designate floating mines. All these measures made it possible to evacuate from the Hanko nearly 28,000 men, a considerable quantity of armament, material and foodstuffs.

As new sweeping formations were organised and the operational zones of the Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were extended, sweeping areas were determined according to the operational zones of the naval defence area bases. Each sweeping area was provided with definite quantity of men and equipment.

The mine-probing party became an

important organisational formation. With the active participation of experts it rendered scientific-technological and methodological help to ship's formations in summing the experience of the mine defence, studying the enemy mine-sweeping equipment and introducing new material and methods of its employment.

The mine defence system of the Baltic Fleet's deployment also carried out such missions as a sweeping to ensure safety of operations; sweeping of channels and escorting of ships (craft) after the sweepers; organisation of the approaches to roads and bases; sweeping of roads and harbours of liberated bases; sweeping of test ranges for working up missions for the combat training of the ships.

By April 23, 1945 the Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had three brigades totalling 85 sweepers of various types, 209 sweeper launches and 16 sweeper barges. The sweepers' crews courageously fulfilled their duty under continuous enemy shell-fire and bombing. The sweeper launches of the 1st Order of the Red Banner Division under Lieutenant-Commander G. Ovodovsky, particularly distinguished themselves when sweeping channels in the Narva Bay. Here for the first time the seamen discovered mines provided with special chains instead of a mooring cable. In two weeks they destroyed nearly 1,000 mines.

Seeing that it was impossible to destroy the Soviet sweeper launches with artillery fire, the nazis hurled against the division over 40 combat planes. But this did not stop the courageous seamen from successfully fulfilling the assigned combat mission. All in all the 1st Division destroyed during the war over 1,800 mines. On July 8, 1945 Captain 3rd Rank G. Ovodovsky was awarded the honourable title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

For selfless military labour during the Great Patriotic War many thousands of seamen, starshines and officers of the Baltic Fleet sweepers were awarded Orders and medals. For valour and courage displayed in battle against the Nazi invaders Starshine 1st Class G. Davidenko, Alitchman I. Larin and Captain 2nd Rank F. Pakholchuk were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In severe engagements with the enemy many seamen fell in action. The Soviet people deeply revere the memory of the fallen heroes.

After the Great Patriotic War, when the fleet began regular combat training in peacetime the fleet's miners — "ploughmen of the sea" — went on fighting against mines for a long time. They examined literally every square metre of the Gulf of Finland.

The experience of the Soviet seamen was widely used in clearing the Suez Canal and other areas of mines.

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## STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

### TOLUBKO ON MISSILE FORCES TROOP TRAINING

Moscow **TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE** in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 14 Oct 81)  
pp 4-5

[Article by Army General V. Tolubko, commander-in-chief, Strategic Rocket Forces, deputy USSR minister of defense, Hero of Socialist Labor: "For High Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Within the unified battle ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, standing a steadfast watch over the great achievements of socialism and the peaceful, constructive labors of our people, are the strategic rocket forces. The rocket troops have been charged with the special responsibility of insuring the continuous combat readiness of the most powerful weapons we have for defending the motherland. They are always in a state of operational readiness, always ready, accurately and with guaranteed effectiveness, to carry out their assigned missions of repulsing the sudden attack of an aggressor.

The demands for troop combat readiness, operational readiness, are growing immeasurably under present-day conditions. "Combat readiness," stresses Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, "combat readiness is an alloy of the level of equipment of our troops; the state of their military training; their moral, political, psychological and physical hardening; organization and the readiness of each Soviet fighting man for action in discharging his obligation to his motherland."

Questions connected with the indoctrination and training of personnel in the spirit of high political vigilance, insuring high levels of operational readiness, mastery of weapons and equipment and of improving organization and tightening discipline are a continuous focus of attention for the military council, commanders, staff personnel, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations.

In accomplishing these tasks we make extensive use of scientific methods and forms of work based upon an integrated approach to questions of training and indoctrination. We may take as an example the experience accumulated in the unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I. Shelestov.

There is a continuous concern here to maintain in unit (chast') personnel a deep sense of personal responsibility for faultless performance of their duties and



execution of operational responsibilities. The unit is continuously upgrading its combat and political training programs and looking for and adopting the most effective training methods. The people here strive vigorously to make full use of every minute of training time. In training specialists and developing coordination between crews and subunits (podrazdeleniye) attention is devoted primarily to practicing combat training tasks and normed activities in individual and combination simulators. Each exercise and training period is permeated with a spirit of competitiveness, strict demandingness and faultless execution of all instructions and compliance with all regulations.

Demonstration and instructional-methods exercises are widely employed along with a system in which experienced officers supervise and assist newer ones. Lieutenant Colonel I. Shelestov, the unit commander, provides a good example of how training should be conducted. A master of military skills, he spends a lot of time with his deputies and subunit commanders.

Party political work is also oriented toward enhancing the quality and effectiveness of the entire training and indoctrinational process and efficient organization of all aspects of the service routine. Primary importance is attached to indoctrinating personnel in love for the motherland and to developing a readiness to defend it courageously and steadfastly and feelings of military friendship and comradeship.

All these things yield positive results. The unit has been designated "outstanding" for seven years now. In the year of the 26th party congress its personnel came out as initiators of socialist competition within the Strategic Rocket Forces and honorably fulfilled the demanding obligations they had undertaken.

We give special attention to questions concerning operational readiness. For troops of the strategic rocket forces this type of service consists in the execution of a combat mission of special importance, the highest form of continuous combat readiness on the part of units and subunits and all levels of command and control. Primary importance is attached in this connection to thorough and comprehensive training for all personnel and the development in each man of a constant readiness to perform his combat mission, of a sense of being on the front line and of the greatest vigilance and sense of personal responsibility for faultlessly discharging the obligations which have been imposed upon him. Personnel of the unit in which officer V. Krupin serves maintain an exemplary state of operational readiness. The unit commander and his staff carefully think through the scope and methods to be employed in combat crew training, the sequence in which they will work through normed activities, combat-training assignments, etc. A dynamic, complex situation approximating as nearly as possible the conditions of actual combat is created in the course of their simulator training. All this permits the development of efficient, coordinated action in any situation. In maintaining operational readiness they continuously monitor the performance of their personnel, undertake a thorough evaluation and analysis of errors and insure timely dissemination to the troops of information on examples of faultless execution of assigned missions.

The complexity of today's weapons and equipment defines the special requirements imposed upon the technical training of our missile forces. Thorough technical knowledge, understanding of the theory involved and solid practical skills

constitute one of the basic conditions necessary for competent operation of equipment and maintaining its continuous readiness for use. Our people work daily to improve the technical knowledge and skills of our personnel and to develop in them an ability to exploit to the full the capabilities of our weapon and equipment systems and to operate them competently. A high level of training on the part of our commanders, political personnel, engineering and technical specialists, of all personnel, contributes substantially to accomplishment of this mission.

The missile forces are giving a great deal of attention to helping officers and warrant officers directly involved in the technical training of personnel to improve their own mastery of instructional methods. Such forms of training for command and engineering personnel as assemblies devoted to problems in methods, seminars and demonstration exercises are among those extensively employed. They subject instructional sessions, practice drills, training exercises and procedures for maintaining operational readiness to thoroughgoing analysis, which makes it possible to determine the most effective ways to improve the quality of our training. Programmed instructional systems are being introduced everywhere. Unified methods complexes are now in operation in many units.

Our methods councils are rendering commanders effective assistance in the development of manuals on methods to be employed in instruction on the most difficult topics and in introducing innovative procedures. The methods council headed by officer V. Zarovnyy provides an example of creative, purposeful work. The council devotes its efforts primarily to improving the training provided instructors themselves and to helping them develop an ability to take an integrated approach to use of the entire extensive arsenal of pedagogical methods and to employ proper methods of organizing and conducting each session of instruction, to evaluate trainee performance objectively and to compile data on the results of their performance and progress achieved in fulfillment of socialist obligations. Special attention is devoted to helping young officers at their training sites directly.

The rocket forces have introduced a system permitting continuous monitoring of the course of combat and political training. Data on the accomplishment of combat and political training plans and daily training results achieved in each subunit and for each crew are fed to special monitoring centers at all levels of control. Analysis of this information permits commanders and staff personnel to guide and direct the training process in an objective manner, insure timely identification of deficiencies and weaknesses and to take steps to rectify them.

Successful accomplishment of the tasks involved in developing a mastery in the use of weapons and equipment depends in large part upon the training material, equipment and facilities available. We are doing a great deal to improve and develop them. Our training facilities are now laboratory complexes with training missiles, control panels, equipment units and automated stands and electronic systems. This makes it possible for personnel fully to perform all operations under conditions approximating those of actual combat. Our inventors and rationalizers are making a big contribution to the development of new simulators and training equipment. In the development of new training systems they invariably rely for guidance upon the latest advances in the field of ergonomics. Komsomol members and other young people are participating particularly vigorously in this effort. Our innovators' best work has been exhibited at the VDNKh SSSR [USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements] in the display entitled "The Lenin

Komsomol--For the 26th CPSU Congress." No small number of these innovations have won medals here at our country's most important exhibition.

Proper selection of military specialists in our subunits and combat crews is very important in our view. We are assisted in accomplishing this task by the introduction of scientifically based methods of studying individual personal capabilities and determining occupational aptitudes. Application of these methods substantially reduces the time required to prepare crew members for operational responsibilities and makes it possible for us to arrive at better solutions to problems associated with interchangeability and the coordination and cohering of military personnel. Organizations at all levels have created supernumerary occupational selection services, established appropriate procedures and recommendations and insured the technical support they require. We are continuously improving our efforts in this area: we hold regular conferences on science and practice, assemblies and seminars on the training of specialists in occupational selection.

A powerful means of increasing mastery of combat skills on the part of our personnel is found to lie in socialist competition, which we hold under the banner of striving for the utmost in combat readiness and rigorous adherence to required military procedures. Among our personnel initiatives are widespread under the slogans "No laggards here," "Individual excellence today, unit excellence tomorrow," "Insuring Excellent Equipment Maintenance" and "From a master in the crew to a crew of masters."

To the end of enhancing the effectiveness of competition we are employing a comparative method of evaluating crews and subunits; it involves the use of objective evaluative criteria with respect to both individual rating categories (operational readiness, level of combat and political training, etc) and the combat-readiness level for a subunit or unit as a whole. This permits comprehensive analysis of what our personnel have achieved, more effective utilization of the Leninist principles of publicizing and comparing the ratings of competitors and more objective computation of overall results.

In developing within each soldier an awareness of his own, personal role in accomplishing the missions assigned the Rocket Forces as well as the Armed Forces as a whole, love for his weapons and confidence in their great effectiveness and a conscious striving to be judicious and economical in his operation of military equipment we assign an important role to the dissemination of military technical knowledge. Functioning at unit level we have our universities, lecture services and seminars on technical military topics; we hold regular conferences on problems in military theory and on themes concerning science and practice and contests and competitions for the title of best military-affairs specialist and for best crew and subunit; we organize exhibitions of the work of our rationalizers and inventors; subunits form occupational speciality groups and we actively disseminate new ideas and innovations related to the process of mastering the use of weapons and equipment.

In the year of the 26th CPSU Congress our missile troops have been able to attain new and higher levels of achievement in improving their military skills and to raise the level and quality of unit and subunit operational and combat readiness. We have seen an increase in the number of "outstanding"-rated units and subunits,



"outstanding" ratings achieved in training and in the number of rated specialists and masters of military affairs. An absolute majority of our practice missile launches have been accomplished with an "outstanding" rating. We view what we have achieved as a springboard for further progress along the path toward achieving maximum improvement in the operational capabilities of our forces and increasing their vigilance and combat readiness.

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## DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### DOSAAF CENTRAL COMMITTEE 7TH PLENUM PROCEEDINGS

#### Information Announcement

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 29 Nov 81 p 1

[Article: "USSR DOSAAF Central Committee 7th Plenum: Information Announcement"]

[Text] The 7th Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation and the Fleet was held in Moscow on 25 November 1981.

The plenum was opened by Triple Hero SU Mar Avn A. I. Pokryshkin, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The plenum examined the question "On tasks of DOSAAF organizations stemming from the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport.'"

A briefing on this matter was given by Col Gen A. I. Odintsov, first deputy chairman of USSR DOSAAF CC. Text of the briefing is published in the newspaper.

Participating in the plenum's work were Arm Gen V. I. Petrov, CIC of the Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense of USSR; V. A. Lepeshkin, deputy chief of a department of the CPSU CC; Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov, HSU, chief of Main Navy Staff; Col Gen M. G. Sobolev, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; V. F. Bogatikov, secretary of the AUCCTU; A. V. Zhuganov, secretary of the Komsomol CC; Col Gen A. S. Zheltov, HSU, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans' Committee; HSU Arm Gen A. L. Getman; HSU Arm Gen I. G. Pavlovskiy; Lt Gen Avn G. S. Titov, HSU, USSR pilot-cosmonaut, chairman of the bureau of All-Union Federations of Aviation Sports; Col V. V. Gorbato, twice HSU, USSR pilot-cosmonaut, chairman of USSR Federation of Parachute Sport; and responsible workers of the CPSU CC, USSR Council of Ministers, RSFSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, Komsomol CC, USSR and RSFSR ministries and departments, and public organizations.

Participating in the plenum's work were members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission, chairmen of kray and oblast DOSAAF committees who are not members of central management entities of the Defense Society, deputy chairmen of DOSAAF CC's of union republics and of kray and oblast DOSAAF committees for mass organizational work and military-patriotic propaganda, and Defense Society activists.

Participating in a discussion of the briefing were: V. N. Savin, chairman of BeSSR DOSAAF CC; Lt Gen Avn G. S. Titov, HSU, USSR pilot-cosmonaut, chairman of bureau of All-Union Federations of Aviation Sports; Ye. F. Shkurov, chairman of permanent commission of USSR DOSAAF CC for development of technical and applied military sports, chairman of Penzenskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee; V. P. Kabat-skiy, chief of Kolomyia DOSAAF Technical Sports Club of Ivano-Frankovskaya Oblast; V. I. Rusakov, chief of DOSAAF Central Naval Club; V. P. Zakhavin, first deputy chairman of Committee for Physical Culture and Sports of the USSR Council of Ministers; S. G. Loginov, chairman of DOSAAF primary organization committee of Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov; A. V. Zhuganov, Komsomol CC secretary; S. A. Taraban'ko, seven-times world champion in motor-cycle sport, Honored Master of Sport of the USSR; A. E. Chikste, deputy to USSR Supreme Soviet, Hero of Socialist Labor, chairman of Nakotne Kolkhoz of LaSSR; and Vice Adm N. A. Shashkov, chairman of USSR Ministry of Defense Sports Committee.

The plenum adopted a decree, published in the newspaper, on the agenda item for discussion.

Deputy Chairman of the USSR DOSAAF CC Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin gave an information briefing on the work of the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium and bureau for the period between the 6th and 7th USSR DOSAAF CC plenums. Text of the briefing is published in the newspaper.

An organizational matter was examined at the USSR DOSAAF CC Plenum.

In connection with a transfer to other work the plenum relieved Triple HSU Mar Avn A. I. Pokryshkin of the position of USSR DOSAAF CC chairman and member of the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium.

Plenum participants unanimously expressed fervent thanks to Triple HSU Mar Avn A. I. Pokryshkin for his many years of vigorous and productive work in the post of head of the Defense Society.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Plenum elected HSU Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov to the Central Committee, the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium and as chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation and the Fleet.

USSR DOSAAF CC Chairman, HSU Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov gave a speech at the plenum.

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Flt Adm Georgiy Mikhaylovich Yegorov was born 30 October 1918 in the village of Mestnovo, Volosovskiy Rayon, Leningradskaya Oblast. CPSU member since 1942. In the Soviet Navy since 1936. Completed Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze and the Naval Academy.

During the Great Patriotic War he was a navigator, later assistant commander and, from September 1944, commander of a submarine in the Baltic. He displayed courage, selflessness and high combat proficiency during combat deployments under conditions of strong enemy antisubmarine defense. Participated in sinking a 10,000-ton enemy transport.



After the war he commanded a unit and a force of ships in the Pacific and Northern fleets. From 1963 through 1967 he was chief of staff of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. In January 1967 he became deputy CinC Navy for combat training. From May 1972 on he commanded the Red Banner Northern Fleet and in 1977 was appointed chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy CinC Navy.

Comrade G. M. Yegorov was elected as CPSU CC candidate member and deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In February 1980 he was elected as deputy to the LaSSR Supreme Soviet.

Georgiy Mikhaylovich Yegorov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and decorated with two orders of Lenin, the Order of October Revolution, three orders of Red Banner, two orders of Patriotic War 1st Class, the Order of Red Star, USSR medals and foreign orders.

#### Report of Col Gen Odintsov

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 29 Nov 81 ppl-2

[Report by First Deputy Chairman of USSR DOSAAF CC Col Gen A. I. Odintsov: "On Tasks of DOSAAF Organizations Stemming from the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport'"]

[Text] Comrades! Under the Communist Party's leadership the Soviet people are working persistently to implement the grandiose tasks advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress. Defense Society members greeted with approval and enormous enthusiasm the resolutions of the November 1981 CPSU Plenum and the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation. It is with a feeling of civic pride that they note the new success of the Soviet people in the struggle to fulfill the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and elevate the economic and defense might of the socialist Motherland.

The past forum of party members devoted much attention to questions of indoctrinating harmoniously developed, emotionally mature and physically conditioned fighters for communism in addition to the most important resolutions on a further upswing in the economy and on the country's social-political and social development.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" has become a new and vivid manifestation of the steadfast concern shown by the Communist Party and Soviet government for the people's health, physical conditioning and athletic perfection.

The decree provided a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the status and development of physical culture and sport in our country. It elaborated concrete practical steps for improving the physical culture movement on the basis of the sweeping tasks advanced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress. "The chief task of the physical culture movement and of the entire system of physical indoctrination," states the decree, "is to contribute in every way to strengthening the health of Soviet citizens; increasing their working capacity and labor productivity and their readiness to

defend the Motherland and the achievements of socialism; develop high moral qualities, a hearty spirit, strength and endurance; and bring up a healthy and growing generation bubbling with life."

The Defense Society is given an important place in accomplishing tasks defined by the decree. The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree dated 7 May 1966 gave it the responsibility of managing the development of technical and applied military sports in the country, which are a component of the Soviet physical culture movement. This is not by chance inasmuch as by engaging in such sports the young people become conditioned physically, boys and girls develop moral and volitional qualities, and the sports activities contribute to development of technical thinking, an understanding of equipment and an ability to master it expertly. All this in the final account helps a person master equipment faster both in production and in military service and helps him become a skilled worker or outstanding soldier.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree states that concern for the development of physical culture must assure the creation of conditions under which each citizen of our country could make full use of the opportunity granted him by the Soviet Constitution to engage in physical culture, sports and tourism. This demand relates fully to the USSR DOSAAF. The task has been assigned for DOSAAF together with the Komsomol CC and AUCCTU to assure a further development of mass sports work, include broad masses of the youth in it and strive to have Soviet athletes win world championships. This is one of the important tasks of the Defense Society.

Under the leadership of party and soviet entities and with the active participation of trade union, Komsomol and sports organizations, the USSR DOSAAF achieved certain positive results in the development of technical and applied military sports, with their applied military direction reinforced. There was an increase in the number of persons engaged in these kinds of sports.

According to reporting data of the committees, as of 1 January 1981 there were some 30 million DOSAAF members engaged in technical and applied military sports in our country. There have been 2,708 T/O&E STK [technical sport clubs] and 292 rifle sport clubs set up and operating in DOSAAF organizations. During the last five-year plan there were 7,054 USSR masters of sport trained and over 18.8 million ranking athletes, including some 282,000 master of sport candidates and athletes in the first category.

The role of DOSAAF organizations in taking tests in the norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex in shooting rose somewhat. Certain steps were taken to improve defense sports work in the Society's primary organizations. There are 3,200 STK in primary organizations of enterprises, educational institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and they have a positive influence on the development of technical and applied military sports directly in the labor collectives. The country has 102 children and youth technical sport schools of DOSAAF and of trade unions in operation in which 21,000 children and teenagers take part.

The Soviet Union's national teams perform successfully in many technical sports in the largest international competitions.

But in critically appraising our work in developing sports in light of demands of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport," there are grounds to admit that the overall level of development of technical and applied military sports in the country still does not fully meet the demands of the time, the growing needs of the youth and our capabilities.

The decree requires us to focus chief attention on including workers and the youth in physical culture and sports activities directly in the enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, establishments, educational institutions and place of residence, i.e., organize and conduct sports work chiefly right in the primary organizations. We have many examples of interesting, meaningful work in technical sport clubs of DOSAAF primary organizations.

Many committees, however, do not pay proper attention to this important sector of the Defense Society's work and do an extremely poor job of creating a good physical facility for sports in primary organizations. As a result the defense and sports work is not organized in many primary collectives. A significant portion of young pupils and the rural youth do not participate in it. According to DOSAAF committees' data, practically every third primary organization does not engage in sports at all.

The path to the mass nature of our sport lies only through our primary organizations, through the labor collectives and through technical circles and technical sport clubs at the place of residence. Therefore DOSAAF committees must fundamentally improve defense sports work in primary organizations, viewing this as the chief condition for reliable assurance of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports.

It is important to improve defense sports work of the DOSAAF primary organizations of schools of general education, tekhnikums and vocational-technical schools. Together with agencies of public education and vocational-technical education, Komsomol organizations and pedagogic collectives, they are to carry out measures for extensive development of shooting, model building sport and radio sport in educational institutions and for setting up a system of base points for activities in technical and applied military sports at the population's place of residence, especially in the rural area.

The demand of the CPSU CC and Soviet government for concentrating the practical activities of sport committees on mass development of physical culture and sport relates wholly and fully to DOSAAF committees and organizations.

It is true that an upsurge in the mass nature of many kinds of technical and applied military sports depends on availability of costly equipment and appropriate technical support in DOSAAF organizations. But we have real capabilities for their more successful development in certain kinds of sport: shooting, applied military combined games, model building, the simplest kinds of automobile and motorcycle sport, and parachuting.



The briefer then dwelled on unresolved tasks, deficiencies and ways to overcome them.

Shooting has been and remains the most massive kind of sport in DOSAAF organizations. Lately, however, many Society committees have ceased engaging in it properly and are not taking decisive steps to create reliable conditions for safekeeping of weapons and ammunition in subordinate organizations, as a result of which MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] agencies are forced to confiscate the weapons and ammunition from DOSAAF committees and organizations in order to avoid misappropriation.

This situation must be corrected. An insistent need has appeared to demand that DOSAAF committees and organizations as well as the heads of economic organizations where there are primary DOSAAF organizations, through appropriate local entities of authority, create reliable conditions for storing weapons and ammunition. This will permit DOSAAF committees and other organizations to have weapons and ammunition according to their allowance norms as approved by the USSR DOSAAF CC. Together with trade unions, the Komsomol, other organizations and economic leaders, DOSAAF committees must continue the work of building outdoor and indoor ranges more vigorously. All this will provide an opportunity of engaging in shooting sport more successfully in our organizations and on this basis resolving the problem of the mass nature of shooting sport.

Applied military combined games include an entire complex of exercises contributing to a person's harmonious development and preparation of youth for service in the Armed Forces. Competition in individual exercises of this sport are simple to organize, including in the village, and they require no large physical inputs. In 1979 the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium bureau adopted a special decree on this matter, but this decree is being carried out in an extremely unsatisfactory manner in a number of oblasts and krais.

Various kinds of model building sport are cultivated chiefly among young pupils and can take on a mass character. Joint resolutions of the USSR DOSAAF CC, the USSR Ministry of Education and the State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education were adopted on these matters, but no noticeable improvements occurred.

The work of committees and primary organizations needs serious improvement in increasing the mass nature of the simplest kinds of automobile and motorcycle sports and in the development of parachuting sport.

DOSAAF committees must give the most vigorous assistance to sports organizations in physical training of predraft-age youth at training points; in having them pass all norms of the GTO complex, especially in shooting small caliber weapons and throwing grenades; and in preparing persons with official ratings in technical sports.

The chiefs of DOSAAF training organizations are faced with major tasks in improving the physical training of cadets during the period of their studies. In coordination with Komsomol and sports organizations and making use of the athletic facility of various departments, they must strive to ensure that every

cadet who does not have a GTO badge passes the norms for the sports complex during his studies and receives a rating in one of the sports we are cultivating. DOSAAF committees must create all conditions necessary for preparing workers and students to pass the norms of the GTO complex in shooting. The committees must step up supervision over the work of smallbore ranges, firing ranges and SSK [rifle sports clubs] without allowing formalism in the process of testing in the norms of the GTO complex or allow additions [to scores].

T/O&E sports clubs are one of the deciding elements in the development of sports. A number of organizational measures for improving their T/O&E structure have been conducted in recent years and arrangements have been made for regular retraining of management and instructor personnel of the clubs. Many STK in fact have become genuine centers of sports work, but in a number of clubs sports are poorly developed, and this despite the fact that in conformity with modern requirements each STK even of the lowest category must have at least four sports sections, train 100 rated athletes annually, and every Group IV rifle sports club is to train 150 ranking athletes.

Many DOSAAF committee chairmen are insufficiently effective in directing the work of T/O&E STK's. Despite requirements of the Defense Society Bylaws, resolutions of the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium and the Statute on the Technical Sports Club, rayon (city) committees have merged with the STK's in some krays and oblasts of the RSFSR and some union republics. This led to a situation where over 16 percent of the clubs are not engaged in sport at all. Such clubs are involved only in cost-accounting activities and commit crude infractions of staff and financial discipline.

An inspection and analysis of the work of rayon and city DOSAAF organizations where the STK are united with rayon (city) committees showed that such a practice does not lead to a further development of technical and applied military sports, but to their curtailment. Moreover, a unification of rayon (city) committees with the STK also has a negative effect on cost-accounting activities of the latter.

Each year the T/O&E technical sport clubs in the DOSAAF system prepare over one million specialists for the national economy by engaging in sports work. This is very necessary and important work in the fulfillment of national economic tasks and preparing a technically trained reserve for our Armed Forces. There is no question that rayon and city STK's must continue to develop cost-accounting work, but they are obligated to become above all genuine centers for the development of technical and applied military sports in the city, rayon, oblast, kray and republic. STK's are called upon to provide for the training of ranking athletes, an increase in their sports proficiency, and assistance to primary organizations in developing defense sports work.

We cannot be satisfied by the work of a number of DOSAAF committees in further expanding the STK network under primary organizations. The fact is that during the last five-year plan there has not been an increase in the overall number of these clubs. Society committees must continue the work of expanding the network of rayon and city STK's under primary organizations as a base of mass defense, training and sports work. They must determine their specialization so that all basic kinds of technical and applied military sports are developed in cities and oblasts with consideration of geographic, climatic and other conditions.

The sports clubs of our schools do much that is useful for developing technical and applied military sports. Unfortunately, however, there still are many Society training organizations where work is limited to holding individual sports activities with cadets, and some sports clubs simply do nothing. One of the main reasons for this situation is poor management of the sports clubs on the part of chiefs of DOSAAF schools. But the fact that the sports club councils of these schools usually consist only of T/O&E workers also is of no small importance. They have no representatives of trade union, Komsomol or sports organizations or the sports public. This unquestionably constricts the scale of their work. Such a situation is abnormal and must be corrected.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers directed serious attention in their decree to the unjustifiably large number of all-union, republic, kray and oblast competitions and courses which take people away from work and training.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is conducting some work in this direction, but it is far from completed. The calendar of all-union and all-Russian competitions will be clarified in order to cut to a maximum the unjustifiably large outlays for the travel of athletes and teams and the shipment of equipment. It is proposed to hold more zonal competitions, reduce the number of days in multiphase competitions and make them cost less. The question is being studied about reducing the number of participants and teams in all-union and republic competitions and about changing their programs. Preparatory work must be done in the near future by DOSAAF central, kray and oblast committees.

In accordance with requirements of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree, sports activities in DOSAAF primary, city and rayon organizations should be conducted only during time off from work, and oblast and kray competitions usually should be conducted on Saturdays and Sundays.

In directing attention to the regulation of sports activities and thrifty expenditure of funds, we must not forget in the least about the high organizational and ideological-political level of these activities. Every competition must become a holiday of technical and applied military sport and an active form of propaganda of our Defense Society's many-sided activities.

A strengthening of party and state management of physical culture and sport in the country, as required by the decree, must be supplemented by a further development of voluntary service and particularly an increase in the role of sports federations. At the present time 18 all-union federations have been set up and are operating in the Defense Society, and there are over 900 at locations where 40,000 persons work on a voluntary basis.

The federations and their panels of judges perform extensive work in organizing and holding competitions and resolving many other matters. At the same time the DOSAAF CC's of union republics, departments which handle sports and many DOSAAF committees do not always take account of the great role of the sports public in developing sport and limit themselves to setting up federations; and they take no steps to activate their work. The USSR DOSAAF CC repeatedly directed the attention of DOSAAF committees to their insufficient management of sports federations, but no serious improvements for the better occurred in some areas.



A constant build-up of the physical facility, maintaining present installations in a working condition and using them effectively are necessary conditions for the successful development of technical and applied military sports. Each year the Defense Society allocates considerable funds for these purposes. In the 10th Five-Year Plan 67.5 percent more funds were expended than in the Ninth Five-Year Plan and a considerable number of various sports facilities were constructed. Around 1,000 vehicles, 9,400 carts, 36,000 motorcycles, 2,900 motors for motorboat sport and around 3,000 radios were received. The output of sports equipment at DOSAAF enterprises and associations has been adjusted and is increasing each year.

In speaking of the construction of sports facilities, we must take steps above all for the most rapid completion of installations being built and making them operational. We must continue the long-range program for further strengthening the physical facility on the basis of planned goals. At the same time we should focus attention on creating the simplest sports facilities at enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, educational institutions and in residential areas: smallbore ranges, obstacle courses, and various areas for classes in technical and applied military sports. To this end we must make extensive use of the capabilities and means of enterprises, sovkhoses and kolkhozes, and of volunteers.

It is very important for sports facilities which have been constructed to be kept neat and be used effectively, and for the sports equipment present in large numbers in T/O&E STK's, primary organizations, school sports clubs and other sports organizations to be in serviceable condition.

Together with trade union and physical culture organizations, we must take steps to improve the operation of sports facilities and sports equipment. To this end we must draw up and coordinate schedules for use of sports facilities, seeing that up to 50 percent of work time is allocated daily for classes in technical and applied military sports with the population, especially with children. It must be established that sports facilities are used with a full load on nonwork days for holding mass competitions and demonstrations by athletes.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree focuses particular attention on the need for a fundamental improvement in training and retraining sports cadres at all levels. This direction concerns our sports organizations and DOSAAF committees especially, since we feel an acute shortage of skilled sports cadres. Many heads of our sports organizations and coaches in central clubs and in committees basically are former athletes. They work diligently and have great personal experience, but the lack of theoretical knowledge and pedagogic skills does not always permit them to conduct training-coaching work and indoctrination of the youth at the proper level. In this regard the presidium bureau made a special study in July 1980 of the question "On the status and measures for further improvement of training and retraining of sports cadres in DOSAAF organizations." This decree specifically indicated the procedure for training and retraining sports cadres, both managers as well as coaches, methods instructors and the judging staff. Unfortunately, however, not all chairmen of obkoms, kraykoms or even DOSAAF CC's of union republics understand the importance and significance of raising the professional level of sports cadres.

In the period 1982-1984 we together with the USSR Council of Ministers Committee for Physical Culture and Sport have to make a performance appraisal of our coaching cadres. USSR DOSAAF CC directorates involved with sports, central clubs and DOSAAF committees should perform much preparatory work in connection with this and we must handle it successfully.

Special concern must be given to strengthening the STK's with experienced personnel inasmuch as many clubs still have not become organizational and methods centers for the development of technical and applied military sports. Foremost forms and methods of the training-coaching and indoctrinational process should be adopted more vigorously along with personnel issues.

Up to the present time we have been organizing the work of scientific and medical support of national teams using integrated scientific-medical groups on a volunteer basis. Now a problem-research laboratory of technical and applied military sports has been set up under the USSR DOSAAF CC. It should become the chief organization for conducting this extensive and important work. Only the cooperation of science, medicine and sport can assure a stable increase in athletes' proficiency.

DOSAAF committees and central clubs must improve supervision over the athletes' state of health and broaden medical-sanitary, prophylactic and sanitation services for them. They must instil in the athletes a sense of personal responsibility for strict observance of the athletic regimen.

Games of USSR nations always are notable events in our country's sports life. They develop into a genuine review of the achievements of the Soviet physical culture movement. Technical and applied military sports, the popularity of which is growing each year, are included in the program of the present 8th Summer Games, as they were in the previous games.

The past 7th Summer Games of USSR Nations were distinguished by good organization and high athletic results and unquestionably contributed to the broad dissemination and popularization of technical and applied military sports. Over 50 million of our athletes took part in its starts, with 11 million receiving ratings.

The 8th Summer Games of USSR Nations are called upon to help resolve problems of the mass inclusion of workers, employees, rural toilers, engineers, technicians, students and pupils of schools and PTU [vocational-technical schools] in regular sports activities and in passing norms of the GTO complex. These games, which will take place under the badge of fulfillment of resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport," will become a review of our physical culture movement and a means for its further upswing. In this connection DOSAAF committees and organizations now are faced with major tasks. Success of the Defense Society athletes' performances will be assured if DOSAAF organizations begin to work in close contact with trade union, Komsomol and sports organizations and the administrations of enterprises, establishments, sovkhoses and educational institutions. Organizational committees of the games must be formed in the very near future. They must include the representatives

of trade union, Komsomol, sports and economic organizations and of DOSAAF committees. Collective thought must be given to a calendar of future competitions, schedules for use of sports facilities, and the manning of composite teams.

On the basis of the mass nature of the USSR DOSAAF CC, the committees and our sports organizations have to perform work persistently and purposefully to raise the proficiency of DOSAAF athletes, set new records and high athletic achievements, and win and hold a leading position in the international sports arena in the basic forms of technical and applied military sports. For these purposes we must regulate the system for preparing ranking athletes, candidates for master of sport, and masters of sport of the USSR and place this work on a firm material-technical footing. We must reinforce the work of training sports reserves and raise the effectiveness of the work of children and youth technical sport schools, sports clubs of educational organizations and STK's.

Bringing up our youth as ideologically mature, spiritually rich, communistically persuaded, utterly devoted to the socialist Motherland and ready for highly productive labor and defense of the Motherland is one of the chief tasks stemming from resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Its fulfillment requires skilled use of all forms of indoctrination work. Physical culture and sport are given considerable emphasis in this process. And if we consider the fact that people come into sports as children or teenagers, i.e., when the character of a future builder of communism is being shaped, it will become understandable how important the ideological-moral indoctrination of athletes is.

The process of indoctrinating the youth is many-sided and occurs under conditions of an aggravation of ideological struggle. In this connection the question of a further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work among athletes becomes more acute than ever. In recent years such work has improved somewhat in DOSAAF organizations. USSR DOSAAF committees and central clubs have begun to devote more careful attention to this sector of their activities, forms have diversified and the ideological direction of sports activities has been reinforced. But the ideological indoctrination work being conducted with athletes still does not fully meet the increased demands of our party at the present stage.

The task of committees, organizations and all sports subunits of the Defense Society is to improve sharply the ideological indoctrination work with athletes, to organize constant, purposeful political studies in all composite teams and sports schools, indoctrinate the youth in a spirit of high Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, of devotion to the cause of communism and a readiness to struggle for victory in the world sports arena, and to eradicate resolutely in sports such unhealthy phenomena as conceit, moneygrubbing and infractions of the athletic regimen. To this end we must include political classes and political information briefings in the program of training-coaching courses and regularly conduct activities in sports collectives to expand the general educational and cultural horizons. We must show more interest in athletes' work, studies and participation in social life in labor collectives and educational institutions, and their conduct in everyday life.



Technical and applied military sports lately are being covered more and more widely in pages of the press, in television and radio broadcasts and in the work of the Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF. But in our view the propaganda of technical and applied military sports must be conducted on a considerably broader plane. We must make use of the entire arsenal of propaganda means. This will help attract many thousands of Soviet citizens to regular technical sports activities. Information and propaganda work at sports facilities and the introduction of holiday rituals and colorful ceremonies for conducting sports competitions at all levels also require improvement.

Successful implementation of a program for a further upsurge in the mass nature of physical culture and sport in the area of technical and applied military sports is inconceivable without close coordination of DOSAAF organizations with trade union, Komsomol and sports organizations and sports societies. The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" obligates the USSR DOSAAF CC, DOSAAF CC's of union republics and kray and oblast committees to expand and strengthen business ties with these organizations.

Practical implementation of this decree will require DOSAAF committees and organizations to give their all and to take a more mature and vigorous approach than before to the level of organizational, political and ideological work of our cadres, especially the managers. The question is about a fundamental improvement of the work, an improvement in the management style and methods on the part of every committee and every organization of DOSAAF.

Allow me to express confidence that committees, organizations and all members of the Defense Society will implement persistently the directions of the Communist Party and Soviet government for a further upsurge in the mass nature of physical culture and sport and will do everything possible to see that technical and applied military sports are an important means for preparing Soviet citizens and especially the youth for productive labor and defense of the Motherland.

#### Report of Lt Gen Mosyaykin

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 29 Nov 81 p 2

[Information report by deputy chairman of USSR DOSAAF CC Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin: "On the Work of the Presidium and Presidium Bureau of the USSR DOSAAF CC During the Period Between the 6th and 7th Plenums of the USSR DOSAAF CC (1981)"]

[Text] In the period since the 6th Plenum all the work of the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium was subordinated to implementing the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, demands stemming from the party CC decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," as well as resolutions of the 8th All-Union Congress and subsequent USSR DOSAAF CC plenums.

Members of the Defense Society of many millions greeted the 64th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, results of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum, resolutions of the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and theses



and conclusions set forth in the speech at the plenum by CPSU CC General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in an atmosphere of high political and labor enthusiasm. They unanimously and fervently approve these program documents and wholeheartedly support the party's domestic and foreign policy and the productive work of the CPSU CC, and the Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, outstanding political and state figure of modern times and tireless fighter for peace and social progress.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium approved a plan of basic measures for fulfilling the tasks stemming from the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, a plan which envisages the conquest of new milestones along basic directions of the Defense Society's patriotic activities by DOSAAF organizations in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

The presidium and presidium bureau devoted chief attention to the work of DOSAAF committees and organizations for a detailed study and propaganda of documents and materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and to augmenting their contribution to the nationwide cause of strengthening the socialist Motherland's economic and defense potential. The presidium bureau adopted the decree "On Participation of DOSAAF Organizations in Propaganda and Study of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Report and Documents and Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress." The presidium bureau discussed the work of DOSAAF organizations of Kurganskaya Oblast in propagandizing materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and steps for improving their work in light of party directions and resolutions of the 6th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF CC.

In fulfilling demands of the 26th party congress and resolutions of the 8th All-Union Congress of the Defense Society, the presidium and presidium bureau continued to exert influence on the practical work of DOSAAF CC's of union republics and of kray and oblast committees for a further ideological and organizational strengthening of Defense Society collectives and for increasing the level of their organizational and political indoctrination work.

Attention was given to a further improvement in the work of primary organizations and an increase in their role of military-patriotic indoctrination of Society members and spreading military and military-technical knowledge among the populace.

During the past period the status of work of managing primary organizations was studied in DOSAAF committees of the Belorussian and Turkmen SSR's, the Juryat-skaya ASSR, and the Belgorodskaya, Bryanskaya, Tul'skaya and other oblasts.

Great significance was attached to high quality in preparing and conducting the report campaign in primary organizations. The presidium bureau adopted the decree "On Conducting Report Meetings (Conferences) in Defense Society Primary Organizations."

The presidium and presidium bureau took steps to increase further the level of committees' organizational work in fulfilling requirements of directive agencies and resolutions of the 8th All-Union Congress and USSR DOSAAF CC plenums.

During the complete and special inspections workers of the USSR DOSAAF CC staff analyzed the practical activities of Society organizations, studied foremost experience, identified causes for deficiencies and omissions, and assisted committees in remedying them.

The presidium and presidium bureau heard reports from the DOSAAF CC's of Belorussian SSR and the Astrakhan', Gor'kiy, Ivanovo, Kirovsk, Kostroma, Kurgan, Moscow, Orel, Tomsk, Chita and Yakutsk committees of the Society on results of work in DOSAAF organizations.

In fulfilling requirements of the CPSU CC Decree "On Further Improvement of Supervision and Check of Execution in Light of Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress," the presidium and presidium bureau directed the efforts of Defense Society committees toward perfecting the forms and methods of supervision and the check of execution.

Questions of a further improvement and increase in the level of organization of socialist competition held an important place in the work of the presidium and presidium bureau.

Considerable work has been done to make conditions of the All-Union Socialist Competition of DOSAAF Organizations conform to requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress and the decree of the CPSU CC, USSR Council of Ministers, AUOCCTU and Komsomol CC "On All-Union Socialist Competition for Successful Fulfillment and Overfulfillment of Goals of the 11th Five-Year Plan." In August 1981 the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium adopted the decree, coordinated with the AUOCCTU and Komsomol CC, "On Affirming Conditions of the All-Union Socialist Competition Among DOSAAF Organizations of Union Republics, Kray and Oblast DOSAAF Organizations and the Russian Federation for the 11th Five-Year Plan."

The presidium bureau devoted constant attention to the further development of socialist competition. The initiative of the Moscow city DOSAAF organization, which made heightened socialist pledges for fulfilling and overfulfilling goals of the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, was approved everywhere and disseminated widely.

The presidium bureau discussed progress in fulfilling socialist pledges by DOSAAF organizations and collectives which were initiators of socialist competition in 1981.

Measures were carried out to improve the system for raising personnel qualifications. Seminars, conferences and training methods courses on basic directions of the Defense Society's work were held with the managers and the aktiv.

The tasks of selection, placement, training and indoctrination of cadres and the public aktiv were accomplished. The presidium bureau discussed the status of organizational work of the Kirovskaya Oblast committee with the public aktiv in light of demands of the Society Bylaws.

In the process of organizational work to fulfill demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU CC Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and

Political Indoctrination Work," DOSAAF committees and organizations improved the joint work with the trade union, Komsomol, the "Znaniye" Society, the Soviet War Veterans' Committee, military units, political entities and military commissariats; and they continued to assist in conducting civil defense activities, to strengthen cooperation with its managing entities, and to take part in propagandizing knowledge and training cadres of mass technical trades in the interests of civil defense. There was an improvement in the forms of joint work with organizations of the Union of Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

The participation of members of the presidium and presidium bureau was provided for in the work of plenums, all-union conferences, other conferences and seminars conducted by the AUCCTU, Komsomol CC and other public organizations and departments.

Following the 6th Plenum the presidium and presidium bureau performed specific work for further increasing the quality of training young people for service in the Army and Navy. The presidium discussed the question of progress in fulfilling the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium Decree dated 27 February 1980 "On the Status of Work to Train the Youth for Service in the Armed Forces and Steps for Its Further Improvement in Light of Demands of the CPSU CC and 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress." It was noted that the organization of the training and indoctrination process is improving. The heightened role of committees in managing DOSAAF training organizations is emphasized during inspections performed by commissions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, military districts, fleets and the USSR DOSAAF CC.

In the past period questions of the status of the training and indoctrination process with draft-age youth were studied in DOSAAF training organizations of the Belorussian, Tajik and Uzbek SSR's and of Kurskaya, Saratovskaya, Tomskaya and Chitinskaya oblasts.

In the time that has gone by work has been carried out for a further increase in the quality of training of cadres for mass technical trades for the national economy.

The presidium adopted the decree "On Fulfillment of Plans for Preparing Personnel for the National Economy in Defense Society Organizations in the 10th Five-Year Plan and Tasks for 1982." It was noted that the plan for training personnel for the national economy was fulfilled by 106.4 percent in the 10th Five-Year Plan.

Guided by demands of the 26th party congress and the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport," the presidium and presidium bureau took necessary steps to develop technical and applied military sports.

The presidium adopted the decree "On a Long-Range Plan for Development of Technical and Applied Military Sports for 1981-1990" for purposes of assuring the planned development of technical and applied military sports in the country and for successful accomplishment of the tasks of further increasing their mass nature, sports proficiency and the indoctrinational role of sports activities.



Sports training facilities continued to develop and improve. The presidium bureau adopted a decree opening the USSR DOSAAF Central Parachuting Club.

In fulfilling resolutions of the 4th Plenum (1979), the presidium and presidium bureau devoted attention to the further development and improvement of the Society's physical and technical facilities. They discussed results of fulfilling the plan for capital investments in the 10th Five-Year Plan and steps for successful completion of construction in 1981. A plan of capital construction was drawn up and approved for the 11th Five-Year Plan.

Following the 6th Plenum the presidium and presidium bureau continued the work of improving and renovating DOSAAF production enterprises and raising the economic planning indicators and quality of products and their importance in providing Society organizations with equipment, training aids and visual aids. Drafts were developed for a five-year plan of economic and social development of DOSAAF enterprises for 1981-1985 and a plan for 1982.

The presidium and presidium bureau continued to deal with problems of improving the financial and economic activities and effective use of physical, labor and financial resources. The presidium discussed results of the Society's financial and economic activities for 1980 and tasks of stepping up the fight against misappropriations, wastes and violations of financial discipline. It was recommended that DOSAAF CC's of union republics and kray and oblast DOSAAF committees draw up and carry out measures aimed at further strengthening the Defense Society's economics.

Measures were implemented following the 6th Plenum aimed at improving monitoring and auditing work, assuring the safekeeping of socialist property, and observing a regime of economy. The presidium bureau adopted the decree "On Serious Shortcomings in Financial and Economic Activities and Monitoring-Auditing Work of the Ivanovskaya Oblast DOSAAF Committee." Substantial omissions were noted in the obkom's work style of selecting, placing and indoctrinating the bookkeeping and auditing staff and in managing the auditing commissions of rayon and city organizations of the Society.

Questions of an increase in quality and effectiveness of conducting DOSAAF lotteries were the focus of attention by the presidium and presidium bureau. DOSAAF lottery tickets for the 1st printing of 1981 were sold promptly. Plans for lottery ticket sales were fulfilled by all republic and oblast organizations of the Society.

Guided by demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and resolutions of the 8th All-Union Congress of the Defense Society, the presidium and presidium bureau continued to improve the forms and methods of business cooperation with defense and sports organizations of socialist countries in the interests of further strengthening the unity and friendship of fraternal nations and expanding the exchange of experience in the job of preparing workers to defend the socialist homeland. Regular multilateral and bilateral meetings were held to discuss current issues of military-patriotic and international indoctrination and the joint practical activities of defense and sports organizations of socialist countries.



Great importance was attached to implementing party demands for increasing the attention shown to Soviet citizens' needs and desires. The presidium bureau adopted the decrees "On Measures for a Further Improvement of Work with Letters and Suggestions of the Workers in Light of Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress" and "On the Status of Work with Letters and Suggestions of Workers in DOSAAF Press Entities."

During this time over 1,180 letters were received by the USSR DOSAAF CC. All of them were examined carefully and concrete steps were taken to implement the suggestions and critical remarks expressed.

Steps were taken to activate the work of USSR DOSAAF CC permanent commissions. Procedures were defined for hearing their accounts in the presidium bureau. During the past period there has been an examination of the work of permanent commissions for mass organizational work, propaganda of military-technical knowledge and preparation of personnel of the mass technical trades for the national economy in DOSAAF organizations, and for preparing the youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces. Note was taken of the increased role of these commissions in studying current problems of Society activities, in developing suggestions and recommendations for DOSAAF committees, and in generalizing and disseminating foremost experience of defense organizations' work.

Necessary steps were taken to improve the planning of work by the presidium and presidium bureau and the quality with which materials presented for their discussion are prepared. The presidium adopted the decree "On Working Procedures of the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium." It was deemed advisable to adopt in its working practice the holding of sessions at least once a quarter. The presidium bureau's hearing of accounts on the practical work of directorates for qualitative and effective resolution of tasks at hand became the rule. Three presidium sessions and 32 presidium bureau sessions were held following the 6th Plenum.

At the same time it is noted that the presidium and presidium bureau did not fully use their reserves and capabilities for a further increase in the level of organizational and indoctrinational work of DOSAAF committees and organizations in accordance with the character and scope of tasks being accomplished.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium and presidium bureau are critically viewing the existing shortcomings and unused reserves and capabilities, and they will continue to direct the efforts of DOSAAF committees and organizations for unconditional fulfillment of resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the achievement of new goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan in the basic directions of the Defense Society's patriotic activities.

## Plenum Decree

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 29 Nov 81 p 3

[Decree of the 7th Plenum of the USSR DOSAAF CC: "On Tasks of DOSAAF Organizations Stemming from the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport'"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Members of the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet greeted with approval and enormous enthusiasm resolutions of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum and the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation. It is with a feeling of deep pride that they note new successes in the struggle to implement the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, to raise the economic and defense might of the socialist Motherland and assure a further increase in the Soviet people's welfare.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" is a new manifestation of the Communist Party's concern for the health of Soviet citizens.

In conformity with resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and directions from CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the decree elaborates concretely and in detail the practical steps for a further upsurge in mass physical culture and sport in the country—an effective means for the comprehensive, harmonious development of the individual and for shaping an active position in life.

The decree emphasized that the chief task of the physical culture movement and the entire system of physical indoctrination is to contribute in every way to a strengthening of Soviet citizens' health; to an increase in their working capacity, labor productivity and readiness to defend the Motherland and achievements of socialism; to the development of high moral qualities, hearty spirit, strength and endurance; and to the bringing up of a healthy and happy growing generation. Technical and applied military sports are intended to serve this purpose.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Plenum views the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree as an aggressive program of action of defense organizations to increase the mass nature of technical and applied military sports and their role in accomplishing sanitation, indoctrinational, national economic and defense tasks.

In carrying out directions of the Communist Party and Soviet government, DOSAAF organizations have improved somewhat in recent years the work of developing technical and applied military sports, augmenting the ranks of athletes, and increasing their proficiency. DOSAAF international sports ties have broadened.

At the same time many Defense Society committees and organizations are not taking effective steps to develop the mass nature of technical and applied military sports, and as a result their scope and qualitative level still do not fully meet modern requirements. Defense sports work is being conducted

extremely poorly in many of the Society's primary organizations and a significant part of the population, especially in the countryside, is not taking part in it. There are serious deficiencies in the organization of defense sports work among students and pupils.

Such forms of sport as applied military combined games and model building have not seen wide development and a drop in the number of persons engaged in the sport of shooting has been noted in some DOSAAF organizations. Proper attention is not being given to a further improvement of defense sports work among youth of predraft and draft ages. The active role of DOSAAF organizations in conducting activities in the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex is not being provided for everywhere.

An unjustifiably large number of all-union, republic, kray and oblast competitions and courses is being held in the Defense Society to the detriment of the mass development of technical and applied military sports among the populace. Large amounts of money are being spent on this and a considerable number of people are being diverted from work and studies.

There is insufficient propaganda of technical and applied military sports and of their social and applied military importance. Many articles in DOSAAF newspapers and journals reduce to a review of various competitions and are insufficiently aimed at including broad masses of workers and the youth in defense sports work. Poor use is made of visual agitation for these purposes.

Indoctrinational work with athletes has not been placed at the proper level everywhere.

The serious shortcomings in development of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports are explained to a considerable extent by poor direction on the part of a number of DOSAAF committees over this important avenue of endeavor of Defense Society organizations and by a lack of the most basic athletic facilities, inventory and equipment in many collectives and at places of residence.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum /decrees:/

1. To approve unanimously the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" and to adopt it for steadfast guidance and execution.

DOSAAF CC's of union republics, kray, oblast, city and rayon committees, primary organizations, and the heads of schools, clubs, production enterprises and sports federations of DOSAAF are to focus efforts on unconditional fulfillment of demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and tasks stemming from the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree, seeing to it that technical and applied military sports, especially shooting, automobile, motorcycle and parachuting sports, truly assume a mass nature. They are to view the work of developing them as one of the important directions in the Defense Society's activities.

To elevate the responsibility of heads of committees, organizations and production enterprises of DOSAAF for a true, mass development of technical and applied



military sports and to place high demands on appointed officials engaged in organizing sports work for the state of affairs in the assigned sector.

To develop, discuss in committees and carry out effective steps for the further development of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports so as to provide an opportunity for a considerable proportion of the workers, especially young people and children, to engage in them in the very near future.

2. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium, DOSAAF CC's of union republics and kray, oblast, city and rayon DOSAAF committees are to improve the direction of defense sports work in DOSAAF organizations, seeking on this basis to achieve a genuinely mass development of technical and applied military sports. To elevate the level of current and long-range planning of defense sports work, to carry out a detailed and comprehensive study of it in Society organizations, to examine regularly current problems of the development of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports, and to make substantiated and concrete decisions for remedying deficiencies and improving work. To provide for effective monitoring of timely and qualitative fulfillment of plans and decisions being made.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to draw up proposals for including basic indicators in technical and applied military sports in state plans for economic and social development and for making necessary changes and clarifications to the system of statistical accounting on the status of defense sports work and development of technical and applied military sports.

To improve coordination of DOSAAF committees' work with trade unions, the Komsomol and sports organizations to resolve the most important tasks of developing technical and applied military sports: training and retraining of cadres responsible for defense sports work and physical training of predraft and draft-age youth for service in the Armed Forces; use of sports facilities; expansion of the network and improvement in the work of defense sports health camps for youth; taking additional steps to reinforce the applied military direction of the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" Young Pioneer and Komsomol games and the "Hopeful Starts" sports games; construction and effective use of facilities; production of sports inventory and equipment; conduct of mass sports activities; organization of indoctrinational work with athletes; and propaganda of sports.

To organize the detailed study and explanation of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" and practical tasks stemming therefrom for the work of the Defense Society to T/O&E workers, the public aktiv and all members of the Defense Society.

To take effective steps to elevate the role of republic, kray and oblast technical sport clubs as sports methods centers and a base for development of technical and applied military sports and for increasing their mass nature.

To continue the work of expanding the network of rayon and city technical sport clubs as a base for mass defense, training and sports work in rayons, cities and primary organizations. To define their direction toward developing basic technical and applied military sports and specialization with consideration of geographic, climatic and other conditions.



To regulate accounting of defense sports work and conduct a resolute struggle against additions in reporting data, eyewash and sham. To consider the status of defense sports work and the mass nature of technical and applied military sports in organizing and summarizing results of socialist competition.

3. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium, DOSAAF CC's of union republics, kray, oblast, city and rayon committees and DOSAAF sports organizations are to carry out concrete steps to regulate the conduct and raise the organizational level of competitions in technical and applied military sports and the training-coaching courses for athletes, and to spend funds thriftily for these purposes.

Sports activities are to be conducted in DOSAAF primary, city and rayon organizations only during time off from work and studies, and oblast and kray competitions usually on Saturdays and Sundays.

To revise calendars of all-union, republic, kray and oblast competitions and courses and reduce their numbers and the size of teams entered.

To draw up a substantiated system of competitions in technical and applied military sports for championship of union republics, krays and oblasts, reducing the travel of composite teams. To hold strictly accountable persons who permit workers and students to be diverted from production and studies for sports competitions and courses, and excesses in spending state and public funds for sports activities to the detriment of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports. To eradicate fully oversimplification and indulgences in evaluating competition results.

4. DOSAAF committees are to focus attention on the inclusion of workers and the youth in technical and applied military sports activities directly at enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, establishments, educational institutions and the population's place of residence.

To improve fundamentally the defense sports work in DOSAAF primary organizations, viewing this as the chief condition for reliable assurance of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports.

To take effective steps to expand the network of technical sport clubs of the Society's primary organizations. In the period 1982-1985 to set up STK's in every primary organization with over 3,000 DOSAAF members and having the necessary physical training facilities.

To develop technical and applied military sports in DOSAAF primary organizations of specialized industrial enterprises and establishments (automobile, motorcycle, aviation, naval, radio and so on) corresponding to their profiles.

To improve defense sports work of DOSAAF primary organizations of schools of general education, schools of vocational-technical education and secondary specialized educational institutions. Together with agencies of public education and vocational-technical education, Komsomol organizations and pedagogic collectives, to carry out steps for broad development of shooting, radio sport and cart racing in schools and PTU [vocational-technical schools] and for setting up sports model building circles in every collective. To include pupils in

work on collective radio stations and to have at least one radio per 20-25 secondary educational institutions. To deem it advisable to hold yearly republic competitions of schoolchildren by correspondence in these sports. To activate work of bringing children and teenagers into competitions for USSR DOSAAF CC prizes: "Young Shooter," "Marksman," "Young Aquanaut" and "Young Ham Operator." To take necessary steps to develop a system of base points for technical and applied military sport activities at the population's place of residence, especially in the rural area.

To organize sponsorship assistance in developing technical and applied military sports in the countryside as well as for schools and PTU on the part of DOSAAF organizations of large industrial enterprises, establishments and educational institutions.

Together with the Komsomol CC and other interested organizations and departments, to hold the All-Union Competitive Review of Primary Komsomol and DOSAAF Organizations and the physical and military-technical training test of predraft and draft-age youth in the period 1982-1983.

To set up physical culture and sport activities among workers of DOSAAF committees, training and sports organizations, and personnel of DOSAAF production enterprises. To see to the introduction of production gymnastics.

To take an active part in shaping healthy interests in the growing generation; to fight persistently against smoking, drunkenness and other injurious habits and inclinations; to instil in DOSAAF members consistently a need for physical and moral improvement; and develop high volitional qualities, courage, endurance and readiness for labor and defense of the USSR.

5. DOSAAF committees and heads of DOSAAF training and sports organizations are to reinforce the work of physical training for youth of predraft and draft ages, directing special attention to organizing their physical training at basic military training points, schools and clubs of DOSAAF.

To reinforce attention in DOSAAF training organizations to the development of technical and applied military sports, primarily in the training profile, and also development of applied military combined games, automobile, radio, motorcycle, parachuting and shooting sports. To see to it that the overwhelming majority of DOSAAF school and air club graduates fulfill qualification standards for ranking athletes in technical and applied military sports.

To improve the physical indoctrination of cadets undergoing training with separation from production. To assure that regular morning gymnastics, out-of-class and elective activities in physical culture, technical sports, applied military sports and other sports are held with them. To organize the work of DOSAAF schools and clubs in assisting primary organizations in the development of defense sports work.

Prior to 1 March 1982 to set up sports clubs in all DOSAAF schools where they have not yet been formed and organize their work as centers of active dissemination of technical and applied military sports among predraft and draft-age youth.

To make fuller use of the physical and technical facility of DOSAAF schools and air clubs in the interests of creating conditions for section activities at the population's place of residence.

6. DOSAAF committees and organizations are to continue the work of involving Society members in passing norms of the GTO complex. They are to set up GTO compounds in sports and training organizations and make wide use of them for the population to pass the complex norms. Set up time in rifle ranges for workers and the youth to pass norms of the GTO complex in rifle shooting and category norms.

7. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium, DOSAAF CC's of union republics, DOSAAF kray and oblast committees, central sports clubs, schools and STK's are to improve ideological indoctrination work with athletes, set up permanent and goal-oriented political studies in all composite teams and sports clubs, indoctrinate the youth in a spirit of patriotism, proletarian internationalism, devotion to the cause of communism and readiness to struggle for victory in the sports arena, and resolutely eradicate unhealthy phenomena in sport such as moneygrubbing, violation of the athletic regimen and dissipation.

8. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium, DOSAAF CC's of union republics, and Defense Society kray and oblast committees are to continue implementing a long-range program for creation and strengthening of a physical and technical facility which provides for mass development of technical and applied military sports and increased proficiency of DOSAAF athletes on the basis of planned goals envisaged by the USSR Council of Ministers decree dated 28 October 1980. They are to take steps to improve training-coaching facilities for preparing USSR national teams in various sports.

To focus attention on creating very basic athletic facilities at enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, educational institutions and residential areas. To make wide use for this purpose of the capabilities and means of enterprises, public resources as well as the Komsomol three-year plan for construction of very basic athletic facilities being carried out by the Komsomol CC.

To involve the youth in strengthening the DOSAAF physical-technical and training facility by construction and renovation of automobile and motorcycle racing tracks and smallbore ranges.

To draw up and coordinate with trade union and physical culture organizations schedules for use of athletic facilities of the Defense Society which are to provide for a daily allocation of up to 50 percent of work time for activities with the populace, especially children, in technical and applied military sports. To assure that athletic facilities are used with full load on days off from work for holding mass competitions and demonstration performances by athletes.

In coordination with trade union and physical culture organizations, to make fuller use of their sports facilities in the interests of developing technical and applied military sports.



To seek additional capabilities for improving deliveries of athletic equipment, inventory and gear to DOSAAF organizations. To expand considerably the production of the kinds of products used in defense sports work in DOSAAF enterprises and increase its quality sharply.

To continue the development of new models and modernization of athletic equipment in order to raise their athletic and operating parameters to a level supporting the attainment of high athletic results.

By the end of 1985 the USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to take steps to meet fully the demand for kits for sports and technical model building.

To assure that established rules for acquiring, accounting for, storing and using weapons are followed strictly. To assure that DOSAAF committees, SSK's, STK's, schools and primary organizations have small caliber and pneumatic weapons according to existing norms of allowances.

9. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to ensure an expansion in scope and improvement in quality of scientific studies into problems of technical and applied military sports.

Together with the USSR Sportkomitet [Committee for Physical Culture and Sports of the USSR Council of Ministers] it is to assure a further improvement in normative and qualification requirements determining the level of sports proficiency on the basis of scientific recommendations. It is to step up assistance to volunteer sports societies and departments in elaborating and coordinating basic test indicators in technical and applied military sports. It is to improve medical supervision over the status of athletes' health and broaden their medical-sanitary, preventive and health services. It is to develop in athletes a sense of personal responsibility for strict observance of the athletic regimen.

10. The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium, DOSAAF CC's of union republics and kray and oblast committees are to strengthen sport cadres and improve their selection, placement, training and retraining. They are to attract politically mature, trained specialists who are capable of supporting a further upsurge in the mass nature of technical and applied military sports and organizing training-coaching and indoctrinational work with athletes at the level of present-day requirements to positions as heads of sports organizations, instructors, methods specialists and coaches. In the period 1982-1984 they are to give performance appraisals for all coaching personnel in technical and applied military sports.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to:

--Revise the list of positions of USSR DOSAAF sports workers;

--Continue improving the system for training and retraining heads of sports organizations and sports specialists;

--Establish that the following undergo retraining at least once every 3-4 years:

Sports workers of DOSAAF CC's of union republics, DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms, and sports organizations of republics, krays and oblasts, at DOSAAF Central Courses;

Workers of sports organizations of cities, rayons and primary organizations, at DOSAAF zonal courses in the system of training methods courses and seminars conducted by Defense Society committees;

--Introduce study of the topic "Technical and Applied Military Sports" in programs for training and retraining DOSAAF cadres;

--Take steps to set up a faculty for training specialists in technical and applied military sports with advanced qualifications in one of the institutes of physical culture and sport in 1982;

--Support publication of methods aids and recommendations for assistance to sports cadres.

11. DOSAAF committees and clubs are to develop and improve persistently volunteer services in defense sports work, improve methods work with the public aktiv and bring in qualified athletes and veterans of sports more extensively to work as coaches, instructors and judges. They are to elevate the role of sports federations and club councils in developing technical and applied military sports, in organizing the training and coaching process and in indoctrinating athletes.

They are to take steps to expand and improve the work of departments of university faculties of social trades in preparing sports organizers.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to activate the work of all-union sports federations and bureaus of federations of technical and applied military sports, reinforce their personnel, and include representatives of trade unions, the Komsomol, sports organizations, ministries and departments more extensively in taking part in them.

It is to take steps to reinforce the positions of federations in international sports organizations.

12. DOSAAF committees and sports organizations are to perform persistent and purposeful work to increase the proficiency of DOSAAF athletes, set new records and the highest sports achievements, and win and hold a leading position in the international sports arena in basic forms of technical sport.

To this end they are to regulate the system of preparing ranking athletes, candidates for master of sport and USSR masters of sport and place this work on a firm organizational and physical-technical base.

They are to step up the work of training sports reserves, raise the work effectiveness of children and youth technical sport schools, sports clubs and STK's, and assist them in expanding the physical-technical base and arranging training and indoctrination work.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to raise the effectiveness of international sports ties and support a high level of preparation of national teams for performances abroad as well as international competitions in technical and applied military sports held in the USSR.

13. DOSAAF committees and sports organizations together with trade union and Komsomol organizations and committees for physical culture and sport are to promote the work of preparing and conducting the 8th Summer Games of USSR Nations in 1981-1983, concentrating efforts on holding mass sports competitions in technical and applied military sports, especially in applied military combined games, and sports holidays directly at enterprises, establishments, educational institutions, kolkhozes, sovkhoses and the population's places of residence. They are to assure the broad participation of workers and especially the youth in the games.

They are to make wide use of the games for creating and placing in order the training and sports facilities and for a further build-up in propaganda of technical and applied military sports.

14. DOSAAF committees are to improve propaganda of technical and applied military sports and their importance in the physical and moral indoctrination of Soviet citizens, in raising labor productivity and in preparing for defense of the Motherland.

They are to attain a high level in conducting mass sports holidays, competitions, and demonstration performances by qualified athletes; and show initiative in including sports programs in public demonstrations and festivals devoted to revolutionary and military-historic holidays.

They are to prepare thoroughly and conduct at a high level competitions for the prizes of Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor and of famous athletes dedicated to notable dates in the life of the country and the Soviet Armed Forces.

They are to improve publicity of sports activities, take steps to increase attendance in them, especially by Young Pioneers and schoolchildren, and ensure a high indoctrinational effect of sports activities.

The USSR DOSAAF CC Presidium is to improve propaganda of technical and applied military sports in the "Soviet Patriot" newsreel and in movies produced on order of the USSR DOSAAF CC.

It is to be concerned with seeing that materials, reports and sketches on technical and applied military sports, their achievements and prospects for development are included regularly in programs of central and local television and radio broadcasting studios.

15. Editors of DOSAAF newspapers and journals are to provide active coverage of problems of the development of technical and applied military sports in Defense Society organizations, show the best experience of defense sports work, broadly inform readers about the importance of events of sports life and outstanding achievements of DOSAAF athletes, and be the organizers of interesting and useful sports initiatives.



They are to establish prizes for achievement of a mass character and high results in various technical and applied military sports, be the initiators in holding head-to-head competitions and competitions by correspondence, and popularize the winners.

Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF is to increase the publication and improve the quality of literature, posters, booklets, manuals and methods recommendations on technical and applied military sports in DOSAAF primary organizations and at the population's places of residence, and publication of other printed products on sports topics.

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The USSR DOSAAF CC Plenum expresses confidence that committees, organizations and all members of the Defense Society will implement persistently the directions of the Communist Party and Soviet government for a further upsurge in the mass nature of physical culture and sport and will do everything possible to see that technical and applied military sports are an important means for preparing the Soviet youth for productive labor and defense of the Motherland.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### INTERNATIONAL POLICIES OF U.S. DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 1, Jan 82 pp 46-49

[Article by V. Petrov under the rubric "International Affairs": "U S A: World Gendarme Concept Revived"]

[Text]

The recent few years witnessed a new unprecedented drive of the United States to set a dominating foot over a good half of the world. Claiming ultimate leadership the US seeks to impose its ways on individual states and even on entire continents. An assortment of different means are used to this end including the force of arms.

The US "great empire" ambitions manifested themselves more than once in the past. The United States emerged from World War II the only possessor of the atomic weapon and the most economically powerful capitalist state in the world, laying down the law to numerous countries. That was the time when the quest for world leadership was especially manifest in the Washington top quarters. Their main efforts were directed at reshaping the world "the American way" and thus tying it to their apron strings.

The effect of this drive both for America and other countries is well known. The adventurist US war in Vietnam took away millions of human lives and resulted in a loss of American prestige as leader of the Western world. The ill-fated Vietnam war was condemned by the Americans themselves who realised the futility of these superpower aspirations. Yet as the United States pulled out of the "Vietnamese syndrome" some individuals in Washington set themselves to preaching a new crusade for restoration of American grandeur.

The present-day US domineering aspirations are motivated by many reasons. For one thing Washington is anxious to stop the decline of its prestige and the ensuing loss of the US political

positions in the world. Indeed the time of the American rule in the Atlantic community has gone, its part in world industrial production is dropping, and its share in world exports went down from 18 to 12 per cent between 1960 and 1979. The two rivals of the United States—Western Europe and Japan have been gradually gaining strength.

In order to survive in the ruthless capitalist competition and to preserve the monopolists' interests, Washington schemed a concept of "world leadership" and "US special responsibility" that can supposedly be assumed by America alone.

The US ruling circles cannot reconcile themselves to the growing defensive capacity of the USSR which precipitated a strategic parity of forces in the world. (This parity was formally sealed in the SALT-1 treaty in which the USA officially renounced their earlier quest for military supremacy). In its political programme the present Administration did not even take the trouble to mention such terms as "détente" or "peaceful coexistence." It relinquished the principle of military parity and put the stake on arms superiority over the Soviet Union so as to act "from positions of strength."

Washington's present policy of world domination is also aimed at grabbing foreign riches, natural resources and labour power. The USA claims the right to call "a zone of US vital interests" any region of the world that happens to be of any interest to the American transnational monopolies. To justify such claims Washington usually pretends defence of national security.

Assuming a tougher stand in its foreign policy,

just barely short of outright dictate, the Administration has been correspondingly indoctrinating the American public. Playing on the ignorance of many American men and women as to the genuine peaceful policy of the USSR the Administration and monopolies have launched a massive hysterical anti-Soviet campaign aimed at whipping up war psychosis and chauvinism.

The major element of the present-day US foreign policy is a growing arms build-up resulting in a soaring war budget which is due to increase by 200 billion dollars in the coming five years. Incidentally this escalation of military spending is to be effected in part at the expense of the "foreign aid programmes" to the developing countries. Today Washington is no longer camouflaging its policeman's strategy in its foreign dealings. The super-power language in US political statements has become quite common even at major international forums. When the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly (1979) adopted the USSR sponsored resolution condemning hegemonism in international relations the delegation of the USA followed by the delegations of Israel, Canada and Australia voted against it. The past presidential campaign in America was held under the election slogan "Bring America back to greatness."

The US world supremacy strategy extends to the world: allies, both permanent and temporary and the third world — are all supposed to sail in the wake of the US dreadnought. The US has treated its NATO partners right from the outset in a very definite way: it imposes on them the American military-political line on the one hand, and takes advantage of their partnership to pursue its global aims on the other.

Pulling through the idea of "NATO's functions beyond its geographical sphere of influence" Washington tries to involve its European allies in the US neo-colonialist schemes and at the same time have them take an extra burden in the NATO war preparations.

In pursuit of its global goals the USA needs more than NATO. Washington succeeded in making a few steps towards knocking together a broader, tripartite alliance, to include the USA, Western Europe and Japan. During his trip to Japan last May President R. Reagan tried to talk Premier D. Suzuki into an official declaration of Japan's readiness to take a share in the American global strategy and to increase Tokyo's contribution to "the US effort in maintaining peace from positions of strength."

Just as with its West European allies the US tactics here are also double-pronged. On the one hand, it looks for substantial political and mate-

rial support for its activities in Asia, while on the other hand, it seeks to drain Japan of some of its economic competitive power both at home and abroad by making it carry massive military expenditures.

South Africa is also listed among Washington's friends. President R. Reagan called it a "friendly country," "a country presenting major strategic significance for the free world." The present US Administration displays far more sympathy towards the SAR than the previous leadership. This sympathy is accentuated by substantial arms deliveries as well as by restoring commercial links in exchange for her participation in the US plans in the South Atlantic and in Africa.

In the Middle East and in South Asia the US policeman strategy firmly reclines on Israel and Pakistan — the two outposts of subversion against the national-liberation movement. Pakistan has proved of late an especially capable US disciple in this respect. After the revolution in Iran it grew into a most rabid proponent of the aggressive US policy. Washington generously supplies it with arms, encourages its aggressive acts against Afghanistan and subversive activities against India. The Pakistani naval bases are open for American warships, while Washington extends a three billion dollars credit to Islamabad. All this testifies to the fact that Pakistan is becoming a permanent springboard for the US expansionist policy in the Middle East and South Asia.

Especially ruthless is the US strategy in relation to the developing countries. The USA would not reconcile itself to the collapse of the colonial system. It perpetrates the grossest acts of interference in the internal affairs of the developing countries — aggression, economic blackmail and the like — to undermine their will for self-determination, sovereignty, for preservation of their national riches from the marauding multinational corporations.

An important aspect of the US military-political strategy is to guarantee itself safe access to the energy and other resources of the developing nations. To justify the repressive actions against the opposing national-liberation forces Washington masterminded and launched a campaign against so-called "international terrorism." Identifying the national-liberation struggle with "international terrorism" and laying the blame for it on the Soviet Union, Washington stops at nothing, even the force of arms, to obstruct the way of the nations towards their freedom and independence. "Newsday" remarkably notes in this connection that the present campaign against "international terrorism"



is nothing else but today's version of the cold war era anticommunism and is intended to prepare the American public for new interventions and a further massive rise in military spendings.

The United States backs up its economic, political and ideological offensive with military means. It has brought the strength of its overseas armed forces to half a million men, maintains over 2,500 war bases and other military installations equipped with up-to-date weapons including nuclear ones. New war bases are being built and the existing modified. Diego-Garcia air force base is being reequipped to receive strategic bombers in the near future. The Pentagon intends to make Diego-Garcia the coordinating centre of a network of US war bases in the Indian Ocean. The US Navy and Air Force have got access to military bases in Egypt (Ras Banas), Kenya (Mombasa), Somalia and Oman. These bases present a special danger to the peoples around the Indian Ocean and the world over as the Pentagon raises its rapid deployment force designed to suppress the national-liberation movements and to tame the "disobedient" nations. Anti-guerrilla warfare forces are being trained on a wide scale to form new notorious "green berets" and "ranger" special units.

It would take too much space just to enumerate all the places on the globe that the USA considers as "areas of vital interests" and plans to defend. The "hottest" place today is perhaps the Indian Ocean. The "arc of instability" concept, masterminded by Z. Brzezinski between 1978 and 1979, (which implies a chain of politically unstable countries along the northern coast of the Indian Ocean from South-East Asia to the Middle East) has formed a suitable pretext for building up the US military presence overseas. From 1978 to 1980 the Pentagon deployed over 30 warships and several US Marine battalions in the Indian Ocean, where just a few years before there had been only three US destroyers. Washington participated in the international debate on limiting military activities there and there was no indication of the future US military build-up. Even last summer the 45-member UN Committee on the Indian Ocean

was to hold a conference in Colombo to establish a zone of peace in that area. However the USA disrupted it on the alleged pretext that "the existing situation did not favour the convocation of such a conference." Even if it was so the only one who did everything to poison the atmosphere by the militarist manoeuvres in the area was the USA itself.

Washington is intensifying its dictatorial policy towards the African states. The Administration asked the US Congress to repeal the Clarke Amendment of 1976 which restricts secret US interference in Angola. Making use of the Pretoria racist regime it continues to fight the national-liberation movement on a mounting scale, opposes the growing prestige of socialism in the region and spares no effort to preserve the imperialist positions in Africa.

Latin America has not been overlooked in Washington's political scheming either. Accustomed to consider it an exclusive US domain, Washington is eager to keep a firm foothold on the continent. It maintains close relationships with reactionary regimes like the Chilean and El Salvador juntas, extends generous military aid to oppressive regimes in Honduras and Guatemala.

The Washington strategists are in haste to take advantage of the misled public to achieve their predatory aims. But these aims are in blatant contradiction with the basic laws of social development, they lack historical perspective and therefore are doomed by life. The developing nations have learned more than once by their own experience what Uncle Sam's "kindness" brings to them. This is the reason for the US failures even in local political actions. The flop in Vietnam, the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran and Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua testify that the development in the young states runs counter to the profit-seeking interests of the USA.

Peace is what humanity needs above all for a normal life. The Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World as of June 23, 1981 specifically calls to defend and consolidate peace, to curb the arms race and to negotiate disarmament.

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